Recent Cases by Staff, Law Review
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 2 
Issue 3 Issue 3 - April 1949 Article 16 
4-1949 
Recent Cases 
Law Review Staff 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Law Review Staff, Recent Cases, 2 Vanderbilt Law Review 464 (1949) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol2/iss3/16 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-RADIO LICENSES-FCC CONTROL OF
RADIO PROGRAMMING
Appellant petitioned the Federal Communications Commission for
authority to increase the power and to change the frequency of his radio
station. If appellant's petition were'granted, he proposed to broadcast Columbia
network programs exclusively and to provide local programs only when CBS
would not service him. The FCC denied the petition on the ground that net-
work scheduling should be limited and particularly fitted to the local needs of
each community by the use of more local programs. Appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. Held, affirmed.' Simmons v. Federal
Communications Commission, 169 F. 2d 670 (App. D. C. 1948), cert. denied,
69 Sup. Ct. 67 (1949).
The physics of the radio spectrum necessitates governmental licensing of
commercial radio outlets. Many more applicants seek radio licenses than there
are available frequencies. 2 Hence, Congress delegated to the FCC the duty
of providing for the public the best practicable use of the nation's limited radio
facilities. 3 This agency is empowered by statute to grant, renew, amend, and
revoke commercial radio licenses whenever the "public interest, convenience,
and necessity" require it.4 Another section of the same Act specifically denies
the Commission any power of censorship under radio broadcasting.5 It is thus
the difficult task of the FCC, if it is to execute the Congressional mandate, to
license stations which will best serve the public, and yet to avoid the imposition
of censorship over its licensees.
In the principal case, the majority of the, court affirmed the commission's
contention that a broadcaster, if he is best to serve the "public interest, con-
1. A concurring opinion condemned the FCC's action as arbitrary and capricious
censorship expressly forbidden by statute. .48 STAT. 1091 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §
326 (Supp. 1948). Nevertheless, this judge concurred in the result because the ap-
pellant sought a frequency already in use in the same area.
2. "Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the limited facilities
of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio inherently is not available to all. That
is its unique characteristic, and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is
subject to governmental regulation." National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U. S. 190, 226, 63 Sup. Ct. 997, 87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943). See also Trinity Methodist Church,
South v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. 2d 850, 852 (App. D. C. 1932) ; Application
of Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F. C. C. 333, 339 (1940).
3. The Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A.
§§ 151 et seq. (Supp. 1948).
4. 48 STAT. 1083 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 307 (Supp. 1948).
- 5. 48 STAT. 1091 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 326 (Supp. 1948). For a discussion of
this statutory prohibition against censorship, see Caldwell, Freedom of Speech and Radio
Brqadcasting, 177 ANNALS 9 (1935). This statute supplements the constitutional guaranty
of freedom of speech and press. U. S. CoNsT. AMND. I.
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venience, and necessity," must tailor the programs of a national network to
the particular needs of this community. A United States Supreme Court de-
cision supports this view. 6
If it is conceded that the FCC can legally evaluate the program service
of broadcasters in determining whether "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" will be best served by granting initial licenses and license renewals,
this program evaluation, even if not direct censorship, necessarily applies in-
direct restraints upon licensees. Under the present short-term licensing system
in which program content is deemed a material element in considering renewal
applications, the FCC controls the air-waves. This control of programming
has been most effective despite the reluctance of the courts to recognize it as
deliberate censorship. 7
Thus far the commission has attempted evaluation only of the total per-
formance of stations, and has not determined which individual programs best
suit the local needs of each community.8
How far the FCC might proceed in exercising radio program controls,
if it should choose to extend its powers to their legal limits, must await a final
determination of the Supreme Court. The commission has decided that broad-
casters must not be advocates in public discussion.9 It has further proposed
6. In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 63 Sup. Ct. 997,
87 L. Ed. 1344 (1943), the Court upheld a number of chain broadcasting regulations
adopted by the FCC to restrict certain practices prevalent between local stations and
national networks, and considered inimical to the public interest. One of these FCC
regulations provided that a station might not contract away its right to reject network
programs [FCC Regulations 3.105 (1941)]. The appellant in the principal case did
not propose to restrict his freedom of program choice by a formal contract with a na-
tional network. The same result would have been achieved, however, by his announced
intention to broadcast all network programs.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court in the NBC case, stated: "[T]he
Commission's powers are not limited to the engineering and technical aspects of radio
communication." 319 U. S. at 215. The opinion proceeded to state that as an incident
of its licensing function, the FCC may consider whether the program policy of an
applicant for a license will serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessity."
Evaluation of this decision is found in WHITE, THE AmERICAN RADIO 167 (1947);
2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 579-81 (1947). See also Segal,
Recent Trends in Censorship of Radiobroadcast Programs, 20 ROCKY MT. L. REv.
366 (1948).
7. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U. S. 190, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 87
L. Ed. 1344 (1943) ; Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bond and Mortgage Co., 289
U. S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 506, 77 L. Ed. 1166 (1933); Trinity Methodist Church, South
v. Federal Radio Commission, 62 F. 2d 850 (App. D. C. 1932), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
685; KFKB Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. Federal Radio Commission, 47 F. 2d 670
(App. D. C. 1931). For a discussion of the significance of the Trinity Methodist and
the KFKB cases, supra, with regard to the FCC's supervision of programming, see
WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 33c (1948).
8. 2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNIcATIONS 641 (1947) ; WARNER, RA-
DIO AND TELEVISION LAW § 38 (1948). On the relationship between "quantitative controls"
and "qualitative controls," see Note, 40 YALE L. J. 967 (1931).
9. In Application of Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F. C. C. 333, 339 (1940), the
commission stated that a radio licensee must not editorialize, or otherwise express any
personal bias over the air. Considerable doubt as to the advisability and constitutionality
of this decision has been expressed by several critics. See WARNER, RADIO AND TELEVSION
LAW § 34f.12 (1948) ; WHITE, THE AiiERICAN RADIO 177 (1947); 2 CHAFEE, GOVERN-
MENT AND MASS COMMtUNICATIONS 638 (1947). The're are indications that the FCC may
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that past program service be measured against a prescribed yardstick to de-
termine whether the public interest warrants license, renewals. 10 The ad-
visability of these measures has been criticised,11 but their constitutionality
has never been tested.
If the licensing function of the FCC is to be exercised intelligently, a
measure of indirect coercion is unavoidable. Perhaps the commission has
gone too far in prescribing the type of programming best suited to community
life.12 If so, Congress should establish a more definite standard than that of
"public interest, convenience, and necessity." While the present standard is
satisfactory for such purposes as requiring that licensees be financially stable
and morally responsible, it is too indefinite to serve as an adequate criterion
for the determination of questions involving freedom of speech and of the
press.13 A more restricted standard would better enable the courts to decide
whether FCC decisions and regulations exceed statutory and constitutional
limitations. The nation should receive the best radio service obtainable; yet
the constitutional guaranty of free speech and a free press must remain in-
violate. A current investigation to achieve this end is being conducted by the
Commission on Freedom of the Press. 14 It has recommended specific action
by Congress, the FCC, the broadcasters, the newspaper and magazine press,
and the general public in order that our system of free enterprise broad-
casting will provide the best obtainable radio service. 15
reconsider its Mayflower decision. See It the Matter of Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, F. C. C. Mim. 11441 (1948).
10. The "yardstick" consists of four factors: (1) the carrying of sustaining pro-
grams, (2) the carrying of local live programs, (3) the carrying of programs devoted to
the discussion of public issues, and (4) the elimination of advertising excesses. FCC,
PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBILITY OF BROADCAST LICENSEES 55 (1946). For an analysis of
the varied criticism that this yardstick has received, see Note, 47 COL. L. Rzv. 1041, 1049
(1947).
11. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RADIO 177, 193 (1947); 2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COImuNiCATiONS 639 (1947) ; Note, 47 COL. L. Rzv. 1041, 1050 (1947) ; WARNER,
RADIO AND TELEvxsIox LAW §§ 34f.12, 36, 38 (1948).
12. The concurring opinion in the principal case emphasizes that the particular de-
mands of a station's listeners, even without administrative direction, will compel each
broadcaster to provide the program service best suited to the needs and desires of persons
in his community. 169 F. 2d at 673.
13. Several recent Supreme Court cases have indicated that when an administrativw
agency takes action which amounts to a restriction of the freedoms guaranteed by the
First Amendment, the standard governing its action, as established by the legislative body,
must be more definite than is required for activities affecting other fields of the law.
E.g., Saia v. New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 113; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 60 Sup. Ct. 900, 84 L. Ed. 1213 (1940) ; ef. Kovacs v. Cooper,
69 Sup. Ct. 448 (1949).
14. This commission was created to consider the freedom, functions, and responsibilities
of the major agencies of mass communications: newspapers, radio, motion pictures, news-
gathering media, magazines, and books. The commission has published several books on
its findings, such as WHiTE, THE AMERICAN RADIO (1947); CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS (1947); HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS (1947); HUTCHINS,
A FREE AND RE PONSIBLE PRESS (1947).
15. WHITE, THE AMERICAN RAIO v-xi, 234-236 (1947). The FCC, by its decision
in the principal case, essentially carried out one of the specific proposals advanced by




SECURITY FOR COSTS IN STOCKHOLDER'S DERIVATIVE SUIT
A shareholder's derivative suit was brought in a federal district court of
New Jersey charging certain officers and directors of a Delaware corporation
with mismanagement and fraud. Pursuant to a New Jersey statute,1 the cor-
poration moved the court to order the complainant to give security in the
amount of $125,000 for reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, which
might be incurred by it and the other parties defendant in the action. The mo-
tion was denied on the ground that the statute is remedial and does not bind the
federal courts. Held, the statute is binding on the court and is not unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F. 2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948).
The stockholder's derivative suit,2 admittedly inadequate and subject to
abuse by strike-suitors, 3 has nevertheless been the minority stockholder's only
practical device for holding corporate directors and officers accountable.
4
Consequently, recent statutes patterned after Section 61-b of the New York
General Corporation Law 5 have been severely criticized on the ground that,
1. "In any action instituted or maintained in the right of any domestic or foreign cor-
poration by the holder or holders of shares ... of such corporation having a total par value
or stated capital value of less than five per centum (5%) of the aggregate par value or
stated capital value of all the outstanding shares of such corporation's stock of every class,
... unless the shares ... held by such holder or holders have a market value in excess of
fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00), the corporation in whose right such action is brought
shall be entitled, at any stage of the proceeding before final judgment, to require the
complainant or complainants to give security for the reasonable expenses, including counsel
fees, which may be incurred by it in connection with such action and by the other parties
defendant in connection therewith for which it may become subject .... to which the cor-
poration shall have recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction shall determine
upon the termination of such action." N. J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (1945).
2. On the general subject see BALLANTINE, CoiroRATioNs 333 et seq. (Rev. ed. 1946);
13 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORmORATIONS §§ 5939-6045 (Perm. ed. 1943) ; STEVENS, COR-
PORATIONS 654 et seq. (1936) ; Hays, A Study in Trial Tactics: Derivative Stockholders'
Suits, 43 COL. L. REV. 275 (1943) ; Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse
-Present and Future, 41 CoL. L. REv. 405 (1941) ; KOESSLER, The Stockholder's Suit:
A Comparative View, 46 COL. L. REV. 238 (1946); Simpson, Fifty Years of American
Equity, 50 HAxv. L. REV. 171, 191 (1936) ; Carson, Current Phases of Derivative Actions
Agaizst Directors, 40 Micn. L. REv. 1125 (1942).
3. "That it [the stockholders' derivative suit] is slow, cumbersome and expensive to
all concerned, if the calculation is limited to the actual cases which reach the courts, can-
not be doubted." Rifkind, J., in Brendle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 526 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ;
Podell, A Non-Bureaucratic Alternative to Minority Stockholders' Suits: A Third View-
point, 43 CoL. L. REV. 1045, 1047 (1943) ; see Note, Extortionate Corporation Litigation:
The Strike Suit, 34 CoL. L. REV. 1388 (1934). For suggested improvements or substitutes
see Berlack, Stockholders' Suits: A Possible Substitute, 35 Mica. L. REV. 597, 604 (1937) ;
Hornstein, A New Forum for Stockholders, 45 CoL. L. REV. 35 (1945) ; Lasswell, A
Non-Bureaucratic Alternative to Minority Stockholders' Suits: A Proposal, 43 COL. L.
REV. 1036 (1943) ; Note, 29 GEo. L. J. 363 (1940).
4. "Despite the numerous abuses which have developed in connection with such suits
... [t]hey have educated corporate directors in the principles of fiduciary responsibility
and undivided loyalty. They have encouraged faith in the wisdom of full disclosure to stock-
holders .... The minatory effect of such actions has undoubtedly prevented diversion of
large amounts from stockholders to managements and outsiders." Brendle v. Smith, 46
F. Supp. 522, 525 (S. D. N. Y. 1942) ; see Shielcrawt v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 64, 71
(Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Bayer v. Beran, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 2, 4, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
5. N. Y. GEN. CorP. LAW § 61-b. The provisions of the New Jersey statute involved
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while they do much to discourage the strike-suit evil, they discourage many
more suits instituted in good faith by minority shareholders without provid-
ing an alternative means of redress or control.6
The principal case is significant in that it is the first in which a federal
cc-irt has passed on the constitutionality of a statute of the "61-b" type.1 In
deciding that'the statute as applied to this particular suit is constitutional, the
court adopts the view of the New York Court of Appeals in Lapchak v.
Baker 8 that, as the amount of required security had not been set below, the
court on appeal needed only to decide whether the requirement of security in
any amount was unconstitutional. In the instant case the court apparently
leaves the question of what amount of security is reasonable, to be answered
in other cases according to the facts peculiar to each. It is not indicated, how-
here, supra note 1, are substantially the same as those of the New York statute. The only
other states having comparable statutes are Pennsylvania and Maryland. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (Supp. 1946); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws art. 16, § 195 (Supp.
1947).
6. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 374 (Rev. ed. 1946) ("drastic legislation ... onerous
requirement.., dangerously oppressive and discriminatory") ; Hornstein, Thc Death Knell
of Stockholders' Derivative Suits in New York, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 123 (1944) ("rich
man's law ... to be hoped no others [states] will follow this example"); Zlinkoff, The
American Investor and the Constitutionality of § 61-b of the New York General Cor-
poration Law, 54 YALE L. J. 352 (1945) ("means the complete disappearance of any
equitable judicial check on [corporate] fiduciaries"). Noting such criticism, the court in
the instant case stated the general proposition that it is not the duty of the court to pass
upon the wisdom of a public policy effected by a legislature, though it seemed that the
statute represented a reasonable effort by the state to "eradicate an evil deemed by its
Legislature to be widespread." 170 F. 2d at 56.
7. The applicability of 'the statute to cases arising in federal courts has heretofore
been the main concern of the federal judges. In Boyd v. Bell, 64 F. Supp. 22 (S. D. N. Y.
1945), the first consideration by a federal court of § 61-b, supra note 5, the court refused
a request for security on the ground that the statute was a local procedural law not af-
fecting the federal court's right to proceed. The same court in Craftsman Finance &
Mortgage Co. v. Brown, 64 F. Supp. 168 (S. D. N. Y. 1945) denied a request, saying that
although the purpose of the law was said to prevent strike suits, the complaint there al-
leged transactions the good faith of which should be tested on trial and that it rests in
the sound discretion of the federal judge under Rule 34 of local civil rules whether the court
will apply state procedure. "If the stockholder's charges are serious, specific and appear to
have merit, the Court's discretion should not be exercised in such a way as to bar a trial
of the issues. To follow such a course, might grant a delinquent or dishonest corporate
director and his accomplices immunity from suit." Id. at 178. In Donovan v. Queensboro
Corp., 75 F. Supp. 131 (E. D. N. Y. 1947), noted in 34 VA. L. Rv. 465 (1948), it was
held that the statute expresses the policy of the state and its application rests in the sound
discretion of the federal judge, but a federal court can and should avail itself of this policy
provided the facts justify the granting of such security.
The court in the instant case terms the New Jersey statute embracing the same pro-
visions a "legal hybrid," at once creating and limiting rights, and says the complainant
cannot escape those statutory limitations on her action by merely suing in the local
federal court instead of the state court, since the federal court must enforce the law and
policy of the state wherein it sits. 170 F. 2d at 54.
8. 298 N. Y. 89, 80 N. E. 2d 751 (1948). Prior to this case, the lower courts of New
York were in disagreement on the constitutionality of § 61-b. Constitutional: Shielcrawt
v. Moffett, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 64 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 268 App. Div. 352, 51 N. Y. S. 2d
188 (1st Dep't 1944), rev'd on other grounds, 294 N. Y. 180, 61 N. E. 2d 435 (1945) ;
Wolf v. Atkinson, 182 Misc. 675, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 703 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Isensee v. Long
Island Motion Picture Co:, 184 Misc. 625, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Unconsti-
tutional: Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd, 268
App. Div. 905, 51 N. Y. S. 2d 754 (1st Dep't 1944). See Note, 159 A. L. R. 978 (1945).
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ever, whether the court woulq consider the matter as a constitutional question
or merely one.of statutory construction and application.
It is said that the right to bring a shareholder's derivative suit is not a
property right but only a means of setting the judicial machinery of the court
in motion 9 and that the "Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a state from
prescribing a reasonable and appropriate condition precedent to the bringing
of a suit of a specified kind or class so long as the basis of distinction is real,'
and the condition imposed has reasonable relation to a legitimate object." 10
Though the statute created a limitation on the plaintiff's right to maintain the
suit at bar, the court held it to be a reasonable limitation and not a legal im-
pairment of that right."
The assurance that the right to maintain a derivative suit "remains
legally unimpaired" is likely to give little comfort or encouragement to one
told that he will have to put up, say, $50,000 12 security as a condition to main-
taining his suit. The only statutory limitation upon the discretion of the court
is the word "reasonable," 13 but even the reasonable expenses in a protracted
and intricate litigation against several defendants, each utilizing the services of
distinguished counsel, may be so formidable as to effectively deprive a plaintiff
of his cause of action, 14 however clear his technical right may be. Since the
interests of stockholders in assets entrusted to the officers and directors of
their corporation are property rights, 15 a statute expressly abolishing the
stockholder's derivative suit would very probably be declared unconstitutional
as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 The legislature should not be
able to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. 17 It may well be assumed that
9. Overfield v. Pennroad Corp., 146 F. 2d 889, 894 (C. C. A. 3d 1944); Continental
Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N. Y. 7,13, 15, 99 N. E. 138, 140 (1912).
10. Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U. S. 171, 181, 44 Sup. Ct. 280, 68 L. Ed. 623
(1924), quoted in 170 F. 2d at 58, as applicable to the principal case.
11. 170 F. 2d at 58.
12. In Donovan v. Queensboro Corp., 75 F. Supp. 131 (E. D. N. Y. 1947), a request
for $50,000 was held not to be unreasonable.
13. See note 1 supra.
14. See'Citron v. Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416, 419 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
15. Goldstein v. Grosbeck, 142 F. 2d 422 (C. C. A. 2d 1944).
16. See RoTTscHAEFER, CONSTITUTIo NAL LAW § 251 (1939). In Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 682, 50 Sup. Ct. 451, 74 L. Ed. 1107 (1930),
Mr. Justice Brandeis said: "[W]hile it is for the state courts to determine the adjective as
well as the substantive law of the State, they must, in so doing, accord the parties due
process of law. Whether acting through its judiciary or through its legislature, a State
may not deprive a person of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a right, which
the State has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was, afforded to him some real op-
portunity to protect it." And see further, Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U. S. 326, 332, 54
Sup. Ct. 140, 78 L. Ed. 342 (1933) ; New York Central R. R. v. White, 243 T. S. 188,
201, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 (1917) ; Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 202, 28
N. E. 1040 (1891).
17. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, 44, 45,
47, 43 Sup. Ct. 55, 67 L. Ed. 115 (1922) ; Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U. S. 331,
337, 40 Sun. Ct. 338, 64 L. Ed. 596 (1920) ; Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. McCray,
291 U. S. 566, 54 Sup. Ct. 482, 78 L. Ed. 987 (1934) ; Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia,
235 U. S. 651, 661, 35 Sup. Ct. 214, 59 L. Ed. 405 (1915); Straus v. Victor Talking
Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791 (C. C. A. 2d 1924).
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few minority shareholders could raise such "reas*onable" security, and few, in
any event, would be willing to gamble it in a lawsuit where the individual share
of recovery would be so disproportionately small, however meritorious the
cause might seem.' 8 It is submitted that such procedure would not be in keep-
ing with the spirit of due process, "fairplay." 19 However, the holding in the
principal case, that the statute is constitutional, may perhaps be sustainable upon
the narrow question raised, i.e., whether the requirement in any amount what-
ever is unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
Those who have awaited with interest a determination of the constitution-
ality of the "61-b" type of statute by a federal court will be disappointed that
this court does not come to grips with the equally important question of equal
protection.2 0 Further attacks using this as one of the weapons may be expected.
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-TAX SALES-RIGHT OF REMAINDERMAN
TO PURCHASE AT TAX SALE TO THE EXCLUSION OF LIFE TENANT
The state purchased land at a tax sale held for nonpayment of taxes
falling due during the time the life tenant was in possession. Neither the life
tenant nor the remainderman 1 redeemed. After the period for redemption, the
remainderman purchased the land from the state. Held, that the purchased
title was not held in a trust capacity and that the life tenant had no equitable
18. See Wadley Southern Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 661, 35 Sup. Ct. 214, 59 L.
Ed. 405 (1915). "'The courts are open and free to.all who have grievances and seek
remedies therefor, and there should be no restraint upon a suitor, through fear of liability
resulting from failure in his action, which would keep him from the courts.' . . . It would
be a negation of the principle and right of free access to the courts to hold that the sub-
mission of rights to judicial determination involved a dangerous gamble which might
subject the loser to heavy damage." Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co., 297 Fed. 791,
799 (C. C. A. 2d 1924).
19. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. v. Nye Schneider Fowler Co., 260 U. S. 35, 44, 43
Sup. Ct. 55, 67 L. Ed. 115 (1922).
20. The court merely says, "we conclude also that the application of R. S. 14: 3-15
to the suit at bar will not fall within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States," and "[the constitutional question] is, we think, answered
fully and clearly by the decision of Chief Judge Loughran in Lapchak v. Baker. .. ."
170 F. 2d at 58, 55. The Lapchak case found that the classification was reasonable in
view of the evil it was enacted to meet. "The Legislature ... inquired and found (1) jus-
tification for making special provision in respect to derivative suits brought by holders of
relatively small amounts of a corporation's stock and (2) occasion for requiring plain-
tiffs in such suits to give reasonable security for the litigation expenses of defendants
therein." Lapchak v. Baker, 298 N. Y. 89, 80 N. E. 2d 751, 753 (1948) ; see Citron v.
Mangel Stores Corp., 50 N. Y. S. 2d 416, 420 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; Zlinkoff, The American
Investor and the Constitutionality of § 61-b of the New York General Corporation Law,
54 YALE L. J. 352, 384 (1945') (attacking the classification as unjust and unreasonable
in view of its purported end).
1. The term "remainderman" will be used herein to include holders of various
types of future interests. Actually in the instant case if the purchaser had any interest
in the premises, it was an executory reversionary interest. Since the title of the state
became absolute after the period for redemption elapsed, the purchaser really had no
interest at all. The court indicated, however, that the result of the case would have
been the same if the purchaser had retained his executory interest. 212 S. W. 2d at 906.
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rights in the land. McGee v. Carter, 212 S.W. 2d 902 (Tenn. App. E. D.
1948).
As a general rule the mere fact that one owns an interest in land does not
preclude his acquiring at a tax sale a new and paramount title to the exclusion
of others having an interest in the same property. 2 However, if the purchaser
has a duty to pay the taxes on the land, and if the land is sold because of his
failure to perform this obligation, then his purchase at the tax sale operates
only as payment of the taxes and leaves the title otherwise undisturbed.
3
It is universally held that a life tenant is under a duty to pay the or-
dinary annual taxes in the absence of some agreement or controlling equity to
the contrary.4 Where by his own neglect he fails to meet this obligation, he is
usually held to be under a disability to purchase the land at a tax sale to the
exclusion of the future interest holders.5 There are two underlying reasons for
this rule: (1) a quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between a life tenant and a
remainderman, placing the life tenant under an obligation to preserve the
estate ;G (2) it would be manifestly unjust to permit the life tenant to profit by
his own breach of duty to pay the current taxes.
7
Conversely, although no cases have been found, it would appear that
where the remainderman is under a duty to pay the taxes,8 as where there
has been a special assessment,9 this would give rise to a similar fiduciary re-
lationship and obligation to preserve the estate in toto, creating a disability on
the remainderman to purchase at a tax sale to the exclusion of the life tenant.
2. 51 Am. JuR., Taxation § 1053 (1944).
3. Id. § 1054; 3 BOGERi, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 486 (1946).
4. E.g., Atkins v. McCoy, 275 Ky. 117, 120 S. W. 2d 1019 (1938); Medford v.
Mathis, 176 Miss. 188, 168 So. 607 (1936) ; Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W.
2d 62 (1939); see Notes, 17 A. L. R. 1384 (1922), 94 A. L. R. 311 (1935), 126 A. L. R.
862 (1940) ; 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 129, 130 (1936) ; 3 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 631,(1936) ; 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 63 (3d ed., Jones, 1939).
5. E.g., Higginbotham v. Harper, 206 Ark. 210, 174 S. W. 2d 668 (1943); Williams
v. Williams, 200 Iowa 398, 202 N. W. 434 (1925); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415,
67 N. W. 505, 32 L. R. A. 744 (1896) ; see Note, 17 A. L. R. 1384, 1399 (1922) ; 1 RE-
STATEMENT, PROPERTY § 149 (1936); 1 TIFFAN'Y, REAL PROPERTY § 68 (3d ed., Jones,
1939).
6. Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505 (1896); Dufley v. McCaskey,
345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W. 2d 62 (1939); Mathews v. O'Donnell, 289 Mo. 235, 233 S. W.
451 (1921) ; 3 S sES, FUrURE INTERESTS § 637 (1936).
7. "It was moreover the duty of the tenant for life tb cause all taxes assessed upon
the estate during his tenancy to be paid; and by neglecting it, and thereby subjecting
the estate to a sale, he committed a wrong against the reversioners. And when he re-
ceived a release of the title, if any were acquired under that sale, he would be considered
as intending to discharge his duty by relieving the estate from that incumbrance. To
neglect to pay the taxes for the purpose of causing a sale of the estate to enable him
to destroy the rights of the reversioners, would have been to commit a fraud upon their
rights. This is not to be presumed. On the contrary he must be presumed to havo in-
tended by procuring that release to extinguish the title under that sale." Varney v.
Stevens, 22 Me. 331, 334 (1843). See also note 6 supra.
8. The future interest holder's duty to pay the taxes usually arises from the con-
struction of a written instrument. See Note, 17 A. L. R. 1384, 1406 (1922).
9. For rules as to the apportionment of a special assessment between the life tenant
and future interest holder, see Note, 83 A. L. R. 793 (1933) ; 1 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§§ 132 et seq. (1936). For the rights, powers and immunities of future interest holders
as against a life tenant see 2 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY C. 13 (1936).
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However, there is a split of authority as to whether a remainderman can
purchase to the exclusion of the life tenant even in cases where the latter has
the primary duty to pay the taxes. A few courts have held that in the absence
of fraud, officiousness, or bad faith on the part of the remainderman who
had no duty to pay taxes, the latter is under no disability to divest the life
tenant of his interest in the land by purchasing at a tax sale. 10 There is
limited authority, however, which states that the very relationship of life
tenant and remainderman gives rise to a relation of confidence and trust,
and that, irrespective of any duty to pay taxes, the remainderman may not
divest the life tenant by purchasing."
Although by statute in Tennessee the tax lien extends to the entire
fee,12 this state follows the accepted common law rule that the life tenant is
primarily obligated to pay the annual taxes.' 3 In the principal case there was
no misconduct by the future interest holder, no special assessment and no
agreement or controlling equity to place a duty on the holder of the future
interest to pay any part of the taxes. The court declined to follow the minority
rule promulgated by the West Virginia court,14 failed to find a fiduciary
relationship which could raise a constructive trust in favor of the life tenant,
and adopted the more equitable and reasonable rule of the leading case,
Jinkiaway v. Ford.1'
4
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-EXCLUSION OF VOLUNTARY
CONFESSION OBTAINED DURING ILLEGAL DETENTION
Petitioner was arrested without a warrant and illegally detained 1 for
thirty hours. Solely on the basis of confessions obtained during this imprison-
ment he was convicted of grand larceny in a federal district court. The Court
of Appeals affirmed,2 and petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. Held
10. Jinkiaway v. Ford, 93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885, L. R. A. 1915E 343 (1915);
Duffley v. McCaskey, 345 Mo. 550, 134 S. W. 2d 62 (1939), 24 MINN. L. REv. 589
(1940); see Fox v. Coon, 64 Miss. 465, 1 So. 629 (1886).
11. Hall v. Hall, 173 Minn. 128, 216 N. W. 798 (1927); Callihan v. Russell, 66
W. Va. 524, 66 S. E. 695, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1176 (1909). In each of these cases, how-
ever, there was misconduct on the part of the future interest holder. This fact would
seem to weaken the doctrine adopted in these cases, in spite of the strong language used.
12. TENN. Coax ANN. § 1331 (Williams 1943).
13. Hadley v. Hadley, 114 Tenn. 156, 87 S. W. 250 (1904); Ferguson v. Quinn,
97 Tenn. 46, 36 S. W. 576 (1896).
14. Callihan v. Russell, 66 W. Va. 524, 66 S. E. 695, 26 L. R. A. (N.s.) 1176 (1909).
15. 93 Kan. 797, 145 Pac. 885, L. R. A. 1915E 343 (1915). In some jurisdictions
the rights of life tenant and future interest holder are controlled by statute. E.g., 2 N. C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-410 (1943); OHIO CODE ANN. § 5688 (Throckmorton 1940).
1. FED. R. Cami. P., 5 (a) : "An officer making an arrest ... shall take the arrested
person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available [committing magistrate
and] . . . a complaint shall be filed forthwith."
2. Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. 2d 167 (App. D. C. 1948).
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(5-4),3 that the confessions were inadmissible. Upshaw v. United States, 69
Sup. Ct. 170 (1948).
In McNabb v. United States 4 certain confessions obtained during the il-
legal detention of the defendant were held inadmissible. The Court's opinion
did not make it clear, however, whether this exclusion was imposed as a
penalty on federal officers for violating prescribed rules of procedure or
whether the illegal detention was merely one circumstance which, along, with
others, rendered those particular confessions testimonially untrustworthy. 5
United States v. Mitchell,6 while distinguishable on its facts,7 contained lan-
guage which seemed to support the latter interpretation.8 The instant case in
effect adopts the former, holding that even in the absence of any psychological
compulsion no confession elicited while the accused is held in violation of
federal rules requiring a prompt preliminary examination may be admitted in
evidence against him.
The dissenting opinion contended that the present Court has misinterpreted
the McNabb and the Mitchell decisions in finding a rule of strict exclusion,
and suggested that the spirit of those cases reflects a desire to exclude only
those admissions "extracted under psychological pressure." 9 But it must be
observed that the Court in the McNabb case by-passed possible constitutional
considerations to base the decision on the violation of rules and statutes re-
lating to criminal procedure. 10 This fact would appear to indicate the Court's
desire to formulate a rule of exclusion for the very violation, without regard
to any circumstance of physical or psychological coercion.
That there is objection to a departure from the time honored "voluntary-
3. Majority opinion by Black, J.; Reed, J., dissenting (Vinson, C. J., Burton and
Jackson, JJ., concurring).
4. 318 U. S. 332, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
5. In that case uneducated mountaineers were arrested on suspicion of murder and
confined without commitment in violation of federal statutes for long hours in detention
room bare of seats or other furniture, denied opportunity to see relatives and friends,
and questioned singly and jointly for hours at a time. Confessions obtained during such
period and under such circumstafices were held inadmissible. The Court said, "We hold
only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies of justice and custodians of
liberty forbids that men should be convicted upon evidence secured under the circum-
stances revealed here." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. at 347. The lower courts
promptly split in their interpretation of the decision. E.g., United States v. Corn, 54 F. Supp.
307 (E. D. Wis. 1944) ; United States v. Klee, 50 F. Supp. 679 (E. D. Wash. 1943).
6. 322 U. S. 65, 64 Sup. Ct. 896, 88 L. Ed. 1140 (1944), reh. denied, 322 U. S. 770
(1944).
7. Mitchell confessed immediately after being taken into custody. It was held that
subsequent illegal detention would not retroactively affect admissibility of his confession.
8. "Being relevant, [the confession] could be excluded only as a punitive measure
against unrelated wrongdoing by the police. Our duty in shaping rules of evidence relates
to the propriety of admitting evidence. This power is not to be used as an indirect mode
of disciplining misconduct." 322 U. S. at 70.
9. 69 Sup. Ct. at 183.
10. "Plainly, a conviction resting on evidence secured through such a flagrant dis-
regard of the procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to stand with-
out making the courts themselves accomplices in willful disobedience of law." McNabb v.
United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
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trustworthy" rule of admissibility of confessions 11 is evidenced by the refusal
of state courts to subscribe to the persuasive influence of the Supreme Court,
where similar state statutes and rules were violated ;12 by the disfavor shown
to the proposed adoption of such a rule of exclusion in the Federal Rules; 13
and by the proposal of the Hobbs bill 14 which would make such confessions
admissible.
Whatever view is taken as to the merit of the present decision, it does re-
solve the existing confusion as to the meaning of the McNabb case, since the
inequitable circumstances of that case, bordering on coercion, were not present
here. Whether the present case is considered an extension of the McNabb
rule, as suggested by the dissent, or merely a re-application of that former
rule, as held by the majority, the result is a mandate to federal courts that
when existing rules are violated, exclusion of confessions obtained thereby
necessarily follows.
There are valid objections both to adoption of a rule of absolute exclusion
and to enactment of legislation such as the Hobbs bill, since the former would
arm the criminal with a powerful weapon, while the latter would be a depar-
ture from rules excluding illegally obtained evidence. 15 It has been suggested
11. 3 WIGMO E, EVIDENCE §§ 822 et seq. (3d ed. 1940).
12. A review of state decisions discussing the McNabb rule presents an interesting
problem when a comparison is made with the rules of admissibility of illegally obtained
evidence. For the status of these rules in the states see Notes, 88 A. L. R. 348 (1934), 52
A. L. R. 477 (1928), 41 A. L. R. 1145 (1926), 32 A. L. R. 408 (1924), 24 A. L. R. 1408
(1923). Rejection of the McNabb rule would follow logically in those states holding
illegally obtained evidence admissible. Hall v. State, 209 Ark. 180, 189 S. W. 2d 917
(1945) ; State v. Browning, 206 Ark. 791, 178 S. W. 2d 77 (1944); People v. Zammora,
66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 152 P. 2d 180 (1944) ; 'Russell v. State, 196 Ga. 275, 26 S. E. 2d
528 (1943) ; State v. Smith, 158 Kan. 645, 149 P. 2d 600 (1944); State v. George, 43
A. 2d 256 (N. H. 1945) ; State v. Nagel, 28 N. W. 2d 665 (N. D. 1947) ; State v. Collett,
58 N. E. 2d 417 (Ohio App. 1944), appcal dismissed, 144 Ohio St. 639, 60 N. E. 2d 170
(1945) ; Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 61 A. 2d 309 (1948) ; Commonwealth v.
Turner, 358 Pa. 350, 58 A. 2d 61 (1948). Contra: Phillips v. State, 248 Ala. 510, 28 S.
2d 542 (1946).
But in those jurisdictions holding illegally obtained evidence inadmissible, rejection
of the McNabb rule would appear to indicate that reasonable detention for the purpose of
improving the case is not considered illegal. Finley v. State, 14 S. 2d 844 (Fla. 1943) ;
State v. Behler, 65 Idaho 464, 146 P. 2d 338 (1944) ; People v. McFarland, 386 Ill. 122.
53 N. E. 2d 884 (1944) ; State v. Ellis, 354 Mo. 998, 193 S. W. 2d 31 (1946) cert. denied,
328 U. S. 873 (1946) ; Fry v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 299, 147 P. 2d 803 (1944) ; Ford v.
State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S. W. 2d 539 (1945) ; McGhee v. State, 183 Tenn. 20, 189 S. W.
2d 826 (1945). Contra: Cavazos v. State, 172 S. W. 2d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943) (an-
nouncing Texas law in accord with McNabb but terming confession voluntary).
For a collection of state statutes similar to those involved in the McNabb case see
McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 342 n. 7, 63 Sup. Ct. 608, 87 L. Ed. 819 (1943).
13. FED. R. CRim. P., Preliminary Draft, § 5(b), submitted to the Supreme Court
May 3, 1943: "Exclusion of Statement Secured in Violation of Rule. No statement made
by a defendant in response to interrogation by an officer or agent of the government shall
be admissible in evidence against him if the interrogation occurs while the defendant is
held in custody in violation of this rule." Quoted in the instant case, 69 Sup. Ct. at 82,
n. 31. The Rules as adopted, effective March 21, 1946, failed to include this subsection.
14. H. R. 4, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). For a history of this proposed legislation
see Note, 38 J. Cans. L. & CRIAIINOLOGY 136 (1947).
15. For a collection of recent federal cases voicing such rules of exclusion see Note,
150 A. L. R. 566, 571 (1944).
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that enactment of a uniform arrest act 16 would provide a solution, in permit-
ting necessary inquiry and questioning before commitment, under strict court
supervision. 17' This procedure would satisfy requirements of legality as well
as safeguard trustworthiness. The unrelenting stand of the Supreme Court in
the present case may well encourage such a step.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ALIMONY-POWER OF COURT TO MODIFY
OR REMIT PAST DUE INSTALLMENTS
Plaintiff obtained a decree for separate maintenance, payable in monthly
installments, for herself and her minor children. Payments were made until
1942, when plaintiff advised defendant that she would accept no more pay-
ments. For four years no payments were demanded or tendered, nor was any,
change in the decree requested of the court. Then plaintiff brought this action,
seeking a money judgment for accumulated arrears. From a. judgment for
defendant, plaintiff appeals. Held (2-1), judgment affirmed; suits for main-
tenance are equitable, and the court has authority to apply equitable principles,
even as to past due installments. Franklin v. Franklin, 171 F. 2d 12 (App.
D. C. 1948).
There is a marked split of authority on the question as to whether a
court has the power to modify alimony provisions retroactively,' i.e., to re-
duce or remit past due installments accruing under a separate maintenance or
divorce decree.2 The rule in the majority of the states is that installments of
alimony become vested when they become due and that the court has no pow-
er to modify the decree as to them. 3 The language of the courts following this
16. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315 (1942).
17. See Note, 38 J. CRim. L. & CIUMINOLOGY 136, 138 (1947).
1. The question as to whether the court has authority to modify alimony provisions,
as to future installments, given in connection with decrees awarding separate maintenance
or divorce a mensa et thoro is universally answered in the affirmative, even in the absence
of statutory authorization, inasmuch as this power exists at common law. However, there
is a sharp disagreement as to the court's power to alter an alimony award granted with
a divorce a vinculo, in the absence of authority reserved in the decree itself or by statute.
The weight of authority seems to deny this power. Banda v. Banda, 192 Ga. 5, 14 S. E.
2d 479 (1941) ; Going v. Going, 144 Tenn. 303, 232 S. W. 443 (1921). KEEzER, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE § 655 (3d ed. 1946). See Notes, 71 A. L. R. 723 (1931), 127 A. L. R. 741
(1940).
2. The term "alimony" as used in its broadest sense includes payments made under
a decree for separate maintenance as well as those made under a divorce decree. In deal-
ing with the matter of reducing past due installments apparently no distinction is made by
the courts between installments accruing under a divorce decree and those accruing under
a decree for separate maintenance. This is indicated in the principal case where the court,
while dealing with a separate maintenance decree, overruled three cases concerned with
divorce decrees.
3. Rochelle v. Rochelle, 235 Ala. 526, 179 So. 825 (1938) ; Adair v. Superior Court,
44 Ariz. 139, 33 P. 2d 995 (1934) ; Keck v. Keck, 219 Cal. 316, 26 P. 2d 300 (1933) ;
Horn v. Horn, 221 Iowa 190, 265 N. W. 148 (1936) ; Whitby v. Whitby, 306 Ky. 355,
208 S. W. 2d 68 (1948); Williams v. Williams, 211 La. 939, 31 So. 2d 170 (1947);
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"vested rights" theory is generally to the effect that "instalments of alimony
become vested is they accrue, and .. . past-due installments become final
judgments, and courts have no authority to cancel or reduce the amount of
such accrued payments." 4 The minority view is that "the trial judge in the
exercise of his discretion may modify or revise the provisions of a decree as
to alimony and also the amount of accrued and unpaid alimony providing
there is a change in the condition of the parties justifying the modification." 1,
The court in the instant case justifies the remittance of the accrued arrears
of maintenance on the ground that suits for maintenance are equitable and
that it would be inequitable, under the circumstances, to force defendant to
pay these arrears. It approved the decision of the lower court which held that
plaintiff was guilty of laches and also that she was estopped by reason of her
direct representation to defendant. Even in a jurisdiction adhering to the
"vested rights" theory the situation presented in the principal case would
seem to lend itself most appropriately to an application of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel. 6 This doctrine is frequently applied in situations in-
volving representations as to an intended abandonment of existing rights, and
some courts have even stated that the expressed intention to abandon an exist-
ing right is the only case in which promises as to the future may be the basis
of an estoppel.7 The courts agree that there can be no estoppel unless the party
has relied on the representation and been induced to act by it,s and he must
have so situated himself that he would suffer a loss as the consequence of his
action, if the estoppel were not raised. "Although this action is usually af-
firmative, yet such affirmative action is not indispensable. It is enough if the
party has been induced to refrain from using such means or taking such ac-
tion as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and
Sullivan v. Sullivan, 141 Neb. 779, 4 N. W. 2d 919 (1942); Briggs v. Briggs, 178 Ore.
193, 165 P. 2d 772 (1946). See Note, 94 A. L. R. 331 (1935).
4. Clark v. Clark, 139 Neb. 446, 297 N. W. 661, 663 (1941).
5. Lytle. v. Lytle, 319 Mich. 47, 29 N. W. 2d 138, 140 (1947); accord, Watts v.
Watts, 314 Mass. 129, 49 N. E. 2d 609 (1943); Kumlin v. Kumlin, 200 Minn. 26, 273
N. W. 253 (1937). See Note, 94 A. L. R. 331, 333 (1935). In Crane v. Crane, 26 Tenn.
App. 227, 231, 170 S. W. 2d 663, 665 (1942), the court, basing its decision on TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 8446, 8454 (Williams 1934), held that "the decree for the support of this
minor child, even as to past-due and unpaid installments, could be modified at any subse-
quent term, so as to increase or decrease the allowance made, as the exigencies of the
case might require."
6. The doctrine of promissory estoppel 'is "distinct from the ordinary equitable
estoppel, since the representation is promissory, not a misstatement of an existing fact."
3 WILLISTON, CONT ACrS 1989 (Rev. ed. 1936). "There are numerous cases in which an
estoppel has been predicated on promises or assurances as to future conduct. Thus an
estoppel may arise from the making of a promise, even though without consideration, if
it was intended that the promise be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and a re-
fusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or result in
other injustice." 3 POmEROY, EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE 211 (5th ed. 1941). See RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRAcrs § 90 (1932).
7. Swinney v. Modern Woodmen of America, 231 Mo..App. 83, 95 S. V. 2d 655
(1936); Berrarducci v. Diano, 60 R. I. 305, 198 Atl. 351 (1938); Barnes v. Boyd, 18
Tenn. App. 55, 72 S. W. 2d 573 (1934). See Note, 115 A. L. R. 152, 155 (1938).
8. 3 PO-mEROY, op. cit. supra note 6 § 812 n. 5.
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saved himself from loss." 9 The facts of the principal case meet this require-.
ment in full, in that the defendant, in reliance upon the representation, re-
frained from availing himself of his privilege of going into court and seeking
a modification, which undoubtedly would have been granted to him due to
his wife's misconduct. 10 The result arrived at is just, and the decision appears
to be sound, both as to its rationale and its conclusion. But the case would
seem to take the District of Columbia out of the ranks of the majority ad-
hering to the "vested rights" theory, in view of the fact that the opinion states
that those prior cases on the subject 11 should be overruled insofar as they
imply that the issuing court lacks authority to apply equitable principles when
asked to enforce payment of accrued installments of alimony.
EMINENT DOMAIN-REMOVAL COSTS WHEN PART OF A LEASE IS
TAKEN-EFFECT OF RENEWAL OF OPTION TAKING ALL OF LEASE
Westinghouse occupied warehouse premises under a lease to expire
Oct. 30, 1944. The United States Government by condemnation proceedings
acquired the use of the premises for a term for years ending June 30, 1943,
with an option to renew for additional yearly periods during the national
emergency. The Government twice exercised this renewal right, thereby ex-
tending the period of its occupancy beyond the expiration date of the Westing-
house lease. Held (2-1), that the cost to Westinghouse of removing its per-
sonal property from the premises might be proved as an element to be con-
sidered in determining the market value of the interests taken. United States
v. Westinghouse Electric and Mfg. Co., 170 F. 2d 752 (1st Cir. 1948).
When private property is taken for public use, the just compensation re-
quired by the Constitution is measured by the value of the interest taken,
ordinarily its market value, and does not include consequential and personal
losses such as loss of profits or damage to good will. Removal costs have
generally been treated as a consequential loss which is not to be compensated.'
However, in United States v. General Motors Corp.,2 the Supreme Court held
that, where the temporary use of property is taken for a period less than the
unexpired portion of an existing leasehold, the tenant may prove his removal
9. Id, at 232.
10. The wife had been living in adultery, and the dissenting judge implies .that this
would have entitled defendant to a modification of the maintenance decree.
11. Lockwood v., Lockwood, 160 F. 2d 923 (App. D. C. 1947); Biscayne Trust Co.
v. American Security & Trust Co., 20 F. 2d 267 (App. D. C. 1927); Caffrey v. Caffrey,
4 F. 2d 952 (App. D. C. 1925).
1. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 66 Sup. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729
(1946). See Note, 156 A. L. R. 397 (1945).
2. 323 U. S. 373, 65 Sup. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. 311 (1945), 39 ILL.. L. RFv. 420, 19
So. CALIF. L. REv. 64. See also Dolan, "lust Compensation" and the General Motors
Case, 31 VA. L. REV. 539 (1945).
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costs, not as an independent item of damage but as an element "which would
certainly and directly affect the market price agreed upon by a tenant and a
sublessee." 3 It is the partial taking which distinguishes that case from the
ordinary case in which the tenant's entire interest is taken and in which
proof of removal costs is not revelant to market price.
4
The present case involves the novel situation in which a taking, initially
partial, by subsequent extension became entire. To this situation the court
with some hesitancy applied the rule of the General Motors case. It is sub-
mitted that the result is an unsound extension of that rule.
The premise of the General Motors case is that a tenant is exceptionally
injured when only part of his interest is taken. The rule of that case is designed
to compensate the tenant for this additional injury which results from the
form of the taking. Removal costs may be proved as an element of that in-
jury.5 If additional injury results from a partial taking, however, it must be
because the splitting up of the property destroys some of its value, because the
parts are worth less after separation than the whole was worth before. This
should be true whether the additional injury is measured in terms of market
value or value to the owner, whether it is to be compensated directly or in-
directly as reflected in an expanded concept of market value.6 Then where,
as here, compensation is awarded for the entire interest, it would seem that
there is no additional injury from the form of the taking and, therefore, that
proof of removal costs should not be received.7
There is another argument supporting this conclusion. As a result of the
condemnation Westinghouse did not have to move out at the end of its term.
This is clearly a benefit which would in most situations offset the loss incurred
by the earlier removal.8 If the loss is relevant to the market price it is logical
that the benefit should likewise be relevant. And if each counteracts the other,
then as a practical matter both should be disregarded.
3. 323 U. S. at 383.
4. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 66 Sup. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729
(1946).
5. "And it might also include the storage of goods against their sale or the cost
of their return to the leased premises." 323 U. S. at 383.
6. Compare the facts of the present case with the not unusual situation in which
part of a tract of land is taken. In that situation the measure of compensation is the
difference between the value of the whole property before the taking and the value after
separation of the part not taken. It has been pointed out that this formula might well
have been adopted in the General Motors case. Note, 26 TEx. L. REv. 199, 209 (1947).
7. The decision of the court turns on the fact that at the time of the taking only a
part of the interest had been taken. It would seem, however, that it is not the form of
the taking but the resulting injury which is important. If no injury results, the form of
the taking should make no difference.
8. This consideration is commonly stated as an additional reason why a tenant whose
entire interest is taken should not be compensated for his removal costs. E.g., United
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372, 66 Sup. Ct. 596, 90 L. Ed. 729 (1946).
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EVIDENCE-CHARACTER WITNESS FOR ACCUSED-CROSS-
EXAMINATION AS TO KNOWLEDGE OF ARREST
MANY YEARS PREVIOUSLY
Prosecution for bribing a federal revenue officer. On cross-examination
four of the defendant's character witnesses were asked if they had ever heard
that defendant had been arrested 27 years earlier for receiving stolen goods.
Over defendant's objection, the trial court permitted this interrogation. The
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,' and defendant appealed. Held (7-2),
2
affirmed. Although an affirmative answer to the question would have tended to
derogate from defendant's charafter, it was admissible to test the extent of
the witnesses' knowledge of defendant's reputation. Michelson v. United
States, 69 Sup. Ct. 213 (1948).
The Supreme Court has never before ruled on the precise question in-
volved in the instant case. The vast majority of state courts 3 and all lower
federal tribunals 4 have held as does the principal case. Thus, almost uni-
versally the rule is that a character witness in a criminal prosecution may be
cross-examined as to his knowledge of rumors of any particular criminal
charges or specific acts of misconduct imputed to the defendant, for the sole
purpose of testing the foundation upon which the witness' opinion of the
defendant's reputation is based. 5 If it appears that the witness has heard of
the charges or bad rumors, his assertion of the defendant's good reputation is
at least partially discredited. 6 If he has not heard of them, his assertion of
the defendant's good reputation is to that extent deficient, for the reason that
he is therefore less qualified to speak on that subject.7 While this rule has
certain inherent objections in that such questioning may be highly prejudicial,8
1. United States v. Michelson, 165 F. 2d 732 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
2. Opinion by Jackson, J.; dissent by Rutledge, J., joined by Murphy, J.
3. State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 Pac. 237 (1929); Moulton v. State, 88 Ala.
115, 6 So. 758 (1889)'; Amos v. State, 209 Ark. 55, 189 S. W. 2d 611 (1945) ; People v.
Gin Shue, 58 Cal. App. 2d 625, 137 P. 2d 742 (1943); State v. Bading, 236 Iowa 468,
17 N. W. 2d 804 (1945); State v. Keul, 233 Iowa 852, 5 N. W. 2d 849 (1942);
People v. Rosa, 268 Mich. 462, 256 N. W. 483 (1934); People v. Fay, 270 App. Div.
261, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 127 (1st Dep't 1945); Lowrey v" State, 197 P. 2d 637 (Okla.
1948) ; Regina v. Wood, 5 Jur. 225 (Eng. 1841). See Note, 71. A. L. R. 1504 (1931).
4. Mannix v. United States, 140 F. 2d 250 (C. C. A. 4th 1944); Josey v. United
States, 135 F. 2d 809 (App. D. C. 1943); Stewart v. United States, 104 F. 2d 234
(App. D. C. 1939); Lawrence v. United States, 56 F. 2d 555 (C. C. A. 7th 1932);
Spalitto v. United States, 39 F. 2d 782 (C. C. A. 8th 1930); Clark v. United States,
23 F. 2d 756 (App. D. C. 1927); Mitrovich v. United States, 15 F. 2d 163 (C. C. A.
9th 1926); Jung Quey v. United States, 222 Fed. 766 (C. C. A. 9th 1915).
5. See notes 3 and 4 supra; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940) ; 1 WIGAMORE,
EVIDENCE § 197 (3d ed. 1940); UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 172 (4th ed.,
Niblack, 1935).
6. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Ibid.
8. "It is to be noted that the inquiry is always directed to the witness' hearing
of the disparaging rumor as negativing the reputation. There must be no question as
to the fact of the inisconduct, or the rule against particular facts would be violated;
and it is this distinction that the Courts are constantly obliged to enforce .... On this
principle such inquiries are almost universally admitted. But the serious objection to
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the accused has the option of putting his character in issue or completely clos-
ing the door to this line of inquiry. 9 Furthermore, the scope of the cross-
examination to test the basis of the witness' opinion is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge.1°
There are two minority views. Illinois has adopted the rule that on cross-
examination of a character witness by the prosecution, the witness can be in-
terrogated only as to acts of misconduct or charges similar in nature to those
for which the defendant is being tried." The North Carolina court has held
that a character witness may be cross-examined concerning the general repu-
tation of the defendant as to particular vices and virtues, but not as to rumors
of any specific acts of misconduct.12 Both of these views would seem to sub-
stantially limit the ability of the cross-examiner to test the extent of the
character witness' knowledge of the defendant's reputation.
While the rule adopted in the instant case makes possible the creation of
-unfair prejudice, 13 nevertheless questioning by the prosecution as to rumors of
specific acts of prior misconduct is the only practical way for the prosecution to
test the qualifications and dependability of the defendant's character witnesses.
By strict supervision 14 and by the exercise of discretion in forbidding ques-
them is that practically the above distinction-between rumors of such conduct, as
affecting reputation, and the fact of it as violating the rule against particular facts-
cannot be maintained in the mind of the jury. The rumor of misconduct, when admitted,
goes far, in spite of all theory and of the judge's charge, towards fixing the misconduct
as a fact upon the other person, and thus does three improper things,-(1) it violates
the fundamental rule of fairness . .. that prohibits the use of such facts, (2) it gets
at them by hearsay only, and not by trustworthy testimony, and (3) it leaves the
other person no means of defending himself by denial or explanation. . . ." 3 WGioRE,
EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
9. Greer v. United States, 245 U. S. 559, 38 Sup. Ct. 209, 62 L. Ed. 469 (1918).
In the instant case the court said: "[I]n cases such as the one before us, the law
foreclosed this whole confounding line of inquiry, unless defendant thought the net
advantage from opening it up would be with him. Given this option, we think
defendants in general and this defendant in particular have no valid complaint at the
latitude which existing law allows to the prosecution to meet by cross-examination an
issue voluntarily tendered by the defense." 69 Sup. Ct. at 223. See also People v. Fay,
270 App. Div. 261, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 127 (1st Dep't 1945).
10. People v. Gin Shue, 58 Cal. App. 2d 625, 137 P. 2d 742 (1943); accord,
People v. Rosa, 268 Mich. 462, 256 N. W. 483 (1934); Lowrey v. State, 197 P. 2d
637 (Okla. 1948); State v. Shull, 131 Ore. 224, 282 Pac. 637 (1929). See also 3
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 987 (3d ed. 1940).
11. People v. Hannon, 381 Ill. 206, 44 N. E. 2d 923 (1942); Aiken v. People,
183 Ill. 215, 55 N. E. 695 (1899).
12. State v. Robinson, 226 N. C. 95, 36 S. E. 2d 655 (1946); accord, State v.
Shepherd, 220 N. C. 377, 17 S. E. 2d 469 (1941). "When counsel in cross-examination
asks a witness if he has not heard that the defendant has been guilty of some specific
and particularly atrocious conduct, even though the witness may answer in the negative,
the average juror is extremely apt to assume from the mere fact the question has been
asked that rumors at least to that effect are afloat, and even perhaps that those rumors
are true." Viliborghi v. State, "45 Ariz. 275, 43 P. 2d 210, 215 (1935).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. "Where it is manifest that the primary object of the cross-examination is not
to discredit or weaken the testimony of the character witness, but to prejudice the
jury against the defendant by proving as a fact that he had on a former occasion
actually committed a specific crime, and it is apparent that the inquiry must have
been so received by the jury to his prejudice, then the evidence thus adduced is im-
proper." Magee v. State, 198 Miss. 642, 22 So. 2d 245, 246 (1945); accord, Common-
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tions whose sole purpose seems to be to prejudice the jury against the de-
fendant, the trial judge can do much towards eliminating this evil. 15 Here, as
elsewhere in the law, the fair administration of justice must depend upon the
ability and high integrity of bench and bar.16
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-FOREIGN CORPORATIONS-WAIVER OF VENUE
BY DESIGNATION OF AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS
Defendant, a New Jersey corporation, did business in New York under
a certificate which designated the Secretary of State as its agent for service of
process.' Plaintiffs, its employees, sued in a New York federal district court
for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 The trial judge dis-
missed for improper venue. Held, order reversed. By appointing an agent to
receive process defendant had waived its venue privilege. Roger v. A. H. Bull
& Co., 170 F. 2d 664 (2d Cir. 1948).
Under the general venue provisions of the old-Judicial Code 3 no civil
suit 4 could be maintained in a federal district court except in the district of
which defendant was an inhabitant or, if jurisdiction was based solely on
diversity of citizenship, in the district where either plaintiff or defendant re-
sided. For venue purposes the courts consistently held that a corporation was
an inhabitant 5 only of the state of its incorporation. 6 This construction severe-
ly limited access to the federal courts in actions against foreign corporations. 7
wealth v. Flynn, 137 Pa. Super. 458, 9 A. 2d 204 (1939) ; Commonwealth v. Thomas, 282
Pa. 20, 127 Atl. 427 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Jones, 282 Pa. 368, 124 Atl. 486 (1924);
also see 3 WIG1MRE, EVIDENCE § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
15. See note 10 supra.
16. "To leave the District Courts of the United States the discretion given to them
b' this decision presupposes a high standard of professional competence, good sense, fair-
ness and courage on the part of the federal district judges. If the United States District
Courts are not manned by judges of such qualities, appellate review no matter how
stringent can do very little to make-up for the lack of them." Concurring opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the principal case. 69 Sup. Ct. at 224.
1. N. Y. GEN. CoR'. LAW § 210.
2. 52 STAT. 1063, 1069 (1938), as amended, 29 U. S. C. A. §§ 207, 216(b) (Supp.
1948).
3. Judicial Code § 51, 18 STAT. 470 (1875), as amended, 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1927).
4. With certain exceptions not here material. Ibid.
5. "Inhabitant" and "resident" are synonymous. Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145
U. S. 444, 447, 12 Sup. Ct. 935, 36 L. Ed. 768 (1892).
6. In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 229, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed.
402 (1895) ; McLean v. Mississippi, 96 F. 2d 741 (C. C. A. 5th 1938), cert. denied, 305
U. S. 623 (1938). And- of the district in which its official residence or principal head-
quarters are located. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Gonzales, 151 U. S. 496, 14 Sup. Ct.
401, 38 L. Ed. 248 (1894) ; cf. Suttle v. Reich Bros. Construction Co., 333"U. S. 163, 68
Sup. Ct. 587 (1948) ; see Dobie, Venue in Civil Cases in the United States District Court,
35 YALE L. J. 129, 134 (1925).
7. Under this rule a foreign corporation, by its right of removal, enjoyed in many
cases a discriminatory power to choose between the state or federal courts. See Ward
v. Studebaker Sales Corp., 113 F. 2d 567 (C. C. A. 3d 1940) ; Notes, 42 ILL. L. REy. 780
(1948), 49 YALE L. J. 724 (1940).
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Venue, however, is a personal privilege which may be waived ;8 and in Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.9 the Supreme Court partly avoided the
restrictive effect of its definition of inhabitant by holding that a foreign cor-
poration which designated an agent for service of process in conformity with
a valid state law thereby waived its privilege and consented to be sued 10
in the federal courts of that state.
In the Neirbo case the act importing consent to the otherwise improper
venue was the designation of a resident agent for process rather than the
transaction of business within the state ;11 and the lower federal courts, in ap-
plying the Neirbo doctrine, have sought to delimit the waiver by the express
terms of the designation. Thus it has been held that a foreign corporation has
not consented to defend actions in which, under state law, process could not
have been served upon the statutory agent, 12 and that, at least in the absence
of a state statute making doing business equivalent to designation, 13 a cor-
poration which fails to file an appointment has not waived its right to insist
upon proper venue.' 4 The instant case is supported by the weight of authority
in holding that the waiver extends to actions which arise under federal laws
and over which state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction.1 Its
8. Commercial Casualty Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U. S. 177,
49 Sup. Ct. 98, 73 L. Ed. 252 (1929); Lee v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 260 U. S. 653,
43 Sup. Ct. 230, 67 L. Ed. 443 (1923).
9. 308 U. S. 165, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939); Notes, 53 HARV. L. Rv.
660 (1940), 38 MIcH. L. Rav. 1047 (1940), 49 YALE L. J. 724 (1940).
10. "Whether such surrender of a personal immunity be conceived negatively as a
waiver or positively as a consent to be sued, is merely an expression of literary prefer-
ence." Frankfurter, J., in Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S.
165, 168, 60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
11. The Court distinguished In re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16
Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402 (1895), in which doing business was held not to imply
waiver of venue. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U. S. 165, 173 n. 15,
60 Sup. Ct. 153, 84 L. Ed. 167 (1939).
12. American Chemical Paint Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 164 F. 2d 208 (C. C. A.
6th 1947) (opinion on rehearing); North Butte Mining Co. v. Tripp, 128 F. 2d 588
(C. C. A. 9th 1942); Ferrante v. Trojan Powder Co., 79 F. Supp. 502 (E. D. Pa.
1947); Harmann v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 64 F. Supp. 36 (W. D.
La. 1946); Laffoon v. J. M. Farrin Co., 57 F. Supp. 908 (W. D. Mo. 1944).13. Knott Corp. v. Furman, 163 F. 2d 199 (C. C. A. 4th 1947), cert. denied, 332
U. S. 809 (1947), 61* HARv. L. REV. 723 (1948), 33 VA. L. REV. 812 (1947); accord,
Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp. 73 (D. Md. 1945) (venue waived by driving under non-
resident motorist statute); Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E. D. S. C. 1943)
(same); ef. RESTATE11ENT,. JUDGMENTS § 30 (1942).
14. I, re Keasbey & Mattison Co., 160 U. S. 221, 16 Sup. Ct. 273, 40 L. Ed. 402
(1895); Moss v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 149 F. 2d 701 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert.
denied, 330 U. S. 839 (1947); Cummer-Graham Co. v. Straight Side Basket Corp.,
136 F. 2d 828 (C. C. A. 9th 1943); see Note, 42 ILL. L. REV. 780, 784 (1948).
15. Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U. S. 4, 60 Sup.
Ct. 215, 84 L. Ed. 537 (1940) (Constitution); Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, Inc.,
156 F. 2d 351 (C. C. A. 9th 1946) (Clayton Act); Iocono v. Anastasio, 75 F. Supp.
602 (S. D. N. Y. 1948) (Fair Labor Standards Act) ; Gibson v. United States Lines,
74 F. Supp. 776 (D. Md. 1947) (same); Beard v. Continental Oil Co., 42 F. Supp.
310 (E. D. La. 1941) (same)- Bowles v. L. D. Schreiber & Co., 56 F. Supp. 814 (D.
Minn. 1944) (Emergency Price Control Act); Bennett v. Standard Oil Co., 33 F.
Supp. 817 (D. Md. 1940) (Jones Act) ; Canright v. General Finance Corp., 33 F. Supp.
241 (E. D. Ill. 1940) (Bankruptcy. Act). Contra: American Chemical Paint Co. v.
Dow Chemical Co., 161 F. 2d 956 (C. C. A. 6th 1947) (Neirbo rule limited to diversity
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statement that under the Neirbo rule designation constitutes waiver in those
suits and only in those which would be cognizable in the state courts, 16 how-
ever, is more restrictive than the decisions warrant; for a majority of the
cases regard appointment of an agent "upon whom all process in any action" i7
may be served as actual consent to be sued in that state even though jurisdiction
is exclusively federal ;18 and the cases which hold otherwise 19 seem to rest on
a misinterpretation of the special venue statute by which they were governed 20
instead of on an implied limitation of the waiver to cases of concurrent juris-
diction. 2
1
The difficulties experienced in the application of the Neirbo rule have
resulted primarily from the fact that it avoided, rather than repudiated, the
notion that a corporation resides where it is born.2 2 The new Judicial Code,
23
which became effective September 1, 1948, represents a much sounder ap-
proach to the problem of venue in actions against corporations.2 4 Section
1391 (c) provides: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in
which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes." 25 By redefining corporate "residence" according to more
modern concepts, the new Code supersedes the consent theory of the Neirbo
case 26 and makes a corporation suable whereVer it is likely to incur liability
cases), criticized in 36 GEo. L. J. 108 (1947), 60 HtAuv. L. REv. 1171 (1947), 27 NEB.
L. REV. 595 (1948). But cf. opinion on rehearing, 164 F. 2d 208 (C. C. A. 6th 1947).
16. 170 F. 2d at 666; see 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 2132 (2d ed. 1948); Note,
49 YALE L. J. 724, 730 (1940).
17. N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 210. But cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4120 (Williams,
1942) : ". . . in all actions or suits brought against it in the courts of this state ...
(italics supplied).
18. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 74 F. Supp.
502 (N. D. Ill. 1947); Randolph Laboratories v. Specialties Development Corp., 62
F. Supp. 897 (D. N. J. 1945); American Blower Corp. v. B. F. Sturtevant Co., 61 F.
Supp. 756 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); Monroe Calculating Mach. Co. v. Marchant Calculating
Mach. Co., 48 F. Supp. 84 (E. D. Pa. 1942); Vogel v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,
36 F. Supp. 74 (D. Md. 1940) ; see Shelton v. Schwartz, 131 F. 2d 805, 808 (C. C. A.
7th 1942).
19. Blaw-Knox Co. v. Lederle, 151 F. 2d 973 (C. C. A. 6th 1945); see Carbide
& Carbon Chemicals Corp. v. United States Industrial Chemicals, Inc., 140 F._2d 47,
50 (C. C. A. 4th 1944); Bulldog Electric Products Co. v. Cole Electric Products Co.,
134 F. 2d 545, 547 (C. C. A. 2d 1943). Contra: California Stucco Products,, Inc. v.
National Gypsum Co., 33 IF. Supp. 61 (D. Mass. 1940).
20. 29 STAT. 695 (1897), as amended, 28 U. S. C. A. § 109 (1927); cf. Stonite
Products Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U. S. 561, 62 Sup. Ct. 780, 86 L. Ed. 1026 (1942).
2h See Note, 42 ILL. L. Riw. 780, 787 (1948).
22. See generally 3 MooRn, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 19.04[3] (2d ed. 1948); Levin,
Federal Venue in Actions Against Corporations, 15 TEmP. U. L. Q. 92, 104-6 (1940) ;
Note, 42 ILL. L. REv. 780, 792 (1948) ; 61 HARV. L. REv. 723 (1948) ; 27 NEB. L. REv.
595 (1948); 33 VA. L. REv. 812 (1947).
23. Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948).
24. See note 22 supra.
25. Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., § 1391 (c) (June 25, 1948).
26. The Neirbo doctrine has not been abrogated, however. It still extends the
statutory limits of venue in suits against defendants registered under fictitious names
statutes, Surclo Manufacturing Co. v. Dunlap, 76 F. Supp. 552 (E. D. Pa. 1948), or
using the highways under non-resident motorist or similar statutes, Andrews v. Joseph
Cohen & Sons, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 732 (S. D. Tex. 1941).
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through its business operations; by codifying the forum non conveniens
doctrine 27 it protects the corporate defendant from the hardships of an
inappropriate forum.
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-SUIT ON FOREIGN REVIVED JUDGMENT-
EFFECT OF LOCAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON REVIVAL
OF JUDGMENTS
Eighteen years after the rendition of a Colorado judgment, it was
revived in accordance with unchallenged Colorado procedure, which permitted
a judgment to be sued on or revived within twenty years of rendition.' Soon
after the revival by the Colorado court, action was brought on that judgment
in Missouri, where the period when a judgment may be subject to suit or
revival is limited to ten years.2 This Missouri statute of limitations, which
by its terms is applicable both to foreign and domestic judgments, was
pleaded as a defense to the action on the Colorado revived judgment. Held,
that since the Colorado judgment was not revived within ten years after its
original rendition, suit on it is barred by the Missouri statute; the full faith
and credit clause does not require that it be enforced. Union Nat. Bank of
Wichita, Kan. v. Lamb, 213 S. W. 2d 416 (Mo. 1948).
When a foreign judgment has been revived by the state of rendition
under its procedure, the cases are not in accord as to whether the statute
of limitations of another state begins to run anew from the date of revival.
Many cases have held that it does.3 Others have held that where the rendering
state considers the revival a mere continuance of the original action, the
statute of the forum runs from the time of the original judgment.4
27. In a somewhat modified form. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
-district or division where it might have been brought." Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess., § 1404(a) (June 25, 1948). See Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. R.., 79 F. Supp.
.821 (D. Minn. 1948); 17 U. S. L. WEIK 3241 (Feb. 15, 1949).
1. "[F]rom and after twenty years from the entry of final judgment in any court
'of this state, the same shall be considered as satisfied in full, unless revived as provided
,by law." 3 CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 93, § 2 (1935).
2. The Missouri statute provides that the judgment is barred at the expiration
,of ten years from the date of original rendition, unless revived by personal service upon
the defendant. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1038 (1939).
3. Kuykendall v. Tod, 219 Fed. 707 (C. C. A. 8th 1915); Tod v. Kuykendall,
206 Fed. 482 (D. Colo. 1913) ; Helton v. Turner, 228 Ala. 403, 153 So. 866 (1934);
Fagan v. Bentley, 32 Ga. 534 (1861); Kratz v. Preston, 52 Mo. App. 251 (1893)
(notwithstanding a want of personal service in the revivor proceedings). As to the
effect of a revival of a judgment, see generally 2 FREE-MAN, JUDGMENTS § 1081 (5th
ed. 1925).
4. Meek v. Meek, 45 Iowa 294 (1876) ; Rice v. Moore, 48 Kan. 590, 30 Pac. 10
(1892); Gardner v. Autrey, 170 Okla. 526, 40 P. 2d 1042 (1934); Collin County
Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 110 Tex. 362, 220 S. W. 767 (1920); Betts v. Johnson, 68 Vt.
549, 36 Atl. 489 (1896). These cases point out the lack of jurisdiction, where defendant
is a nonresident, to render a new judgment on scire facias where he does not appear.
"In the event a sister state or foreign judgment has been revived, this will not affect
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Where the rendering state treats the revival as creating a new judgment,
on which the statute would begin to run anew, if the revival was against
a nonresident defendant on some type of constructive process the additional
-question arises whether the reviving court had jurisdtiction over the non-
resident. Unless due process of law is satisfied in this regard, no effect need
be given the revived judgment under the full faith and credit clause, and
the statute of the forum runs from the time of the original judgment.5
It is well settled as a general proposition that the faith and credit which
must be given the judgment of another state under the Federal Constitution
is that accorded such judgment by the state of its rendition, even though
the judgment is based on a mistake of substantive law or enforcement of
it would be repugnant to the local policy of the forum.6 However, there are
several grounds on which a court may constitutionally refuse to recognize
or enforce a foreign judgment. Want of jurisdiction 7 and fraud in the
procurement of the judgments are two such grounds. In addition, it has
been uniformly held that a state may pass a statute of limitations applicable
to suits on foreign judgments without violating the full faith and credit
the limitation period unless the revivor proceedings are regarded as a new action.
resulting in a new judgment establishing a new liability rather than a mere continuation
of the original judgment. But even where treated as a new action, if personal service.
in the revivor proceedings was not obtained against a nonresident and non-appearing
defendant personally served in the original action, it is field that the judgment of
revival is not effective against, and does not affect, the running of the statute of the
forum." 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 2997 (5th ed. 1925).
5. In speaking of a revival on scire facias, where defendant was a nonresident
and did not appear, the Supreme Court of the United States said, "Viewed as a new
judgment rendered as in an action of debt, it had no binding force in Louisiana, as
Henry had not been served with process or voluntarily appeared. And considered as a
continuation of the prior action and a revival of the original judgment for purposes of
execution, on two returns of nihil,' it operated merely to keep in force the local lien,
and could not be availed of as removing the statutory bar of the lex fori." Owens v.
Henry, 161 U. S. 642, 646, 40 L. Ed. 837, 838 (1896) ; accord, Rice v. Moore, 48 Kan.
590, 30 Pac. 10 (1892); Hepler v. Davis, 32 Neb. 556, 49 N. W. 458 (1891); Collin
County Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 110 Tex. 362, 220 S. W. 767 (1920).
6. Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449, 48 Sup. Ct. 142, 72 L. Ed. 365 (1928)
(refusal of a Washington court to enforce an Oregon judgment which had been given
on a Washington judgment after the Washington statute of limitations had run thereon
held a denial of full faith and credit); Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 15 L. Ed.
475 (U. S, 1866); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039
(1908) (in a suit in Mississippi on a Missouri judgment based on a Mississippi contract
the Mississippi court could not refuse to give full faith and credit to the Missouri
judgment on the ground that the contract was illegal or void in Mississippi) ; 3 FREx-
MAN, JUDGMENTS 2798 (5th ed. 1925).
7. Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 65 Sup. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577
(1945), reI. denied, 325 U. S. 895; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37
Sup. Ct. 152, 61 L. Ed. 386 (1917) ; Jackson v. Kentucky River Mills, 65 F. Supp. '601
(E. D. Ky. 1946); Bower v. Casanave, 44 F. Supp. 501 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Lewis v
United Order of Good Samaritans, 182 Ark. 914, 33 S. W. 2d 53 (1930).
8. Simmons v. Simmons, 19 F. 2d 690 (App. D. C. 1927); Durden v. Durden,
184 Ga. 421, 191 S. E. 455 (1937). This is only where fraud would be a defense in
the state of rendition. Louisville & Nashville R. R. v. Jones' Adm'r, 215 Ky. 774, 286.
S. W. 1071 (1926). See generally 3 FREEM-AN, JUDGMENTS § 1401 (5th ed. 1925);
GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAws 535 (2d ed. 1938).
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clause, 9 for the reason that such statutes affect the remedy only and hence
are procedural matters to be governed by the lex fori.10
Previous cases which have dealt with the question of the effect of a
'evival of a .sister state judgment on the statute of limitations of the forum
do not appear to have considered the problem of full faith and credit. Appar-
ently it has been assumed that if the court granting the revival had
jurisdiction, the revived judgment would have to be given the same recognition
and effect given it by the rendering state. But the Missouri court in the
instant case disregards the real meaning of full faith and credit. Without
considering either the effect given such a revival by Colorado or the question
of whether the Colorado court had jurisdiction to affect the rights of the
defendant, it denies effect to the revived judgment on the ground that the
Missouri statute limits the time within which a judgment can be revived.
But a Missouri statute could not constitutionally affect the validity or effect
of a revival in Colorado of a Colorado judgment. The court, in holding that
it did, contravened the basic and well established meaning of the full faith and
credit clause that the same faith and credit must be given the judgment as is
given it in the state of its rendition."
The decision may or may not be correct on the facts. This would depend
on the question of the effect given such a revival in Colorado and also on
whether the Colorado court had jurisdiction over the defendant in the
revival proceedings. Neither of these questions was considered by the court
in its opinion.
JUDGMENTS-RES JUDICATA-PRIVITY AS BETWEEN BAILOR
AND BAILEE
The owner of a truck bailed it to another, who collided with a private
car while operating it. The car owner sued the bailee; before judgment,
the bailor commenced this action against the car owner. Judgment in the
first suit having been rendered for the car owner, he sought leave to interpose
9. M'Elmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 10 L. Ed. 177 (U. S. 1839); Randolph v.
King, 20 Fed. Cas. 260, No. 11,560 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1867); Kelly v. Heller, 74 Colo.
470, 222 Pac. 648 (1924) ; Schemmel v. Cooksley, 256 Ill. 412, 100 N. E. 141 (1912) ;
Meek v. Meek, 45 Iowa 294 (1876); McArthur v. Goddin, 12 Bush 274 (Ky. 1876).
But cf. Lamb v. Powder River Livestock Co., 132 Fed. 434 (C. C. A. 8th 1904) (three
months statute of limitations on foreign judgments held so unreasonable as to constitute
a violation of the full faith and credit clause). See generally, 3 FREEMAN, JUDGAIENTS
§ 1456 (5th ed. 1925).
10. Metcalf v. Watertown, 153 U. S. 671, 14 Sup. Ct. 947, 38 L. Ed. 861 (1894)
Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22, 15 L. Ed. 811 (U. S. 1857); Rice v. Moore, 48 Kan.
590, 30 Pac. 10 (1892) ; Arrington v. Arrington, 127 N. C. 190, 37 S. E. 212 (1900).
11. The court in the instant case said "A foreign judgment, original or revived,
has the same standing in Missouri, no better, no worse, than a domestic judgment."
213 S. W. 2d at 419. Another very recent case in which the court committed the same
egregious error is Ross v. Beall, 215 S. W. 2d 225 (Tex. Civ. App, 1948). There the
court denied effect to a Louisiana divorce decree on the ground that if rendered in
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a supplemental plea of this judgment in bar to the action by the bailor. Held,
the plea could not be received because the finding of negligence against the
bailee in the prior action was not res judicata against the bailor in this action,
there being no privity between the bailor and bailee. Hudson Transit Corp. v.
Antonucci, 61 A. 2d 180 (N. J. 1948).
Where suit is brought on a cause of action and a valid judgmeni on
the merits is renderd, those affected by the judgment, under the doctrine of
res judicata,' include not only the parties to the litigation, but those in
privity with them.
2
Privity in res judicata has been said' to be limited to relationships
involving property rights,3 and to require mutual or successive relationships
to the same property rights which were the subject matter of the prior
litigation.4 Since persons in privity are bound because the same property
rights were involved in the prior litigation, these rights must have been
acquired after the commencement of the suit,5 or in some cases after the
rendition of the judgment.6 But this definition of privity describes only one
situation where persons other than parties may be affected by the rules of
res judicata.7 Persons who had a financial or proprietary interest in the
litigated issues and controlled the litigation, 8 or whose interests were su-fi-
Texas under the procedure used, it would not have been valid, and that the presumption
was that the law of Louisiana was the same as that of Texas in the absence of a showing
to the contrary. It is to be hoped that these two recent decisions do not indicate any
widespread misconception on the part of the state courts as to the proper interpretation
of the full faith and credit clause.
1. The doctrine of res judicata comprises two main rules: (1) A valid judgment
on the merits concludes the parties and their privies as to every matter which was, or
might have been, litigated and bars a second suit on the same cause of action. (2)
Any matter actually litigated and determined by a judgment on the merits is conclusive
on the parties and their privies and cannot be relitigated between them. See Cromwell
v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1876) ; Scott, Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942) ; 2 VAND. L. REV. 135 (1948).
2. Strong v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 F. Supp. 787 (N. D. Tex. 1943);
Patrick v. Daniel, 238 Ky. 172, 37 S. W. 2d 71 (1931); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 534
(1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 407 (5th ed. 1925).
3. McDonald v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 135 S. W. 2d 359 (Mo. App. 1939);
Dillard v. Owens, 122 S. W. 2d 76, 83 (Mo. App. 1938); Hart v. Moulton, 104 Wis.
349, 80 N. W. 599 (1899) ; BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL 142 (6th ed., Carter, 1913).
4. Strong v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 52 F. Supp. 787, 788 (N. D. Tex.
1943); Interstate Electric Co. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 228 Ala. 210,
153 So. 427, 428 (1934); 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS § 549 (1891); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS
§ 438 (5th ed. 1925).
5. National Lead Co. v. Nulsen, 131 F. 2d 51, 56 (C. C. A. 8th 1942), cert. denied,
318 U. S. 758 (1943); Harris Realty Co. v. Austin, 134 Tex. 484, 137 S. W. 2d 19
(1940) ; 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 440 (5th ed. 1925).
6. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122
P. 2d 892, 894 (1942) ; White v. Peterson, 222 Iowa 720, 269 N. W. 878, 880 (1936)
Hocken v. Allstate Insurance Co., 235 Mo. App. 991, 147 S. W. 2d 182, 186 (1941).
"The critical date in determining the question of a purchaser's privity is the commence-
ment of the suit rather than the date of the adjudication except that this may be affected
by statutes governing lis pendens." 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS 967 (5th ed. 1925).
7. See generally, 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 409 (5th ed. 1925); RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 83 (1942) ; Note, 57 HARv. L. Rev. 98, 100 (1943).
8. Western Electric Co. v. Hammond, 135 F. 2d 283 (C. C. A. 1st 1943) ; Kentucky
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ciently represented by a party to the litigation, are bound by the rules of
res judicata. The Restatement of Judgments includes within the meaning of
"privies" all three of the above classes.' 0
In addition there are situations where the rules of res judicata will
affect persons who are neither parties nor "privies" as defined by the
Restatement, such as situations involving derivative or joint liability."
The court in the instant case found io privity between the bailor and
bailee. 12 It described privity as "identity of interest through succession to the
same rights of property involved in the prior litigation." 13 This definition
describes but one of three classes of privies recognized in the Restatentent.
Since the bailor did not control the litigation and his interests were not
represented therein by the bailee, the same result would have been reached
under the broader Restatement definition. But if the bailor had actually
controlled the defense in the prior action against the bailee, he would have
been concluded by the finding of negligence against the bailee. 14 And if the
bailee had sued for the entire injury to the bailed property, as he is privileged
to do,' 5 a judgment in his favor would be a bar to an action by the bailor.16
It has also been held that a judgment against the bailee in such a suit will
Bell Corp. v. Tye, 298 Ky. 674, 183 S. W. 2d 939 (1944); RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS
§ 84 (1942); 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 432, 433 (5th ed. 1925).
9. Weberpals v. Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N. E. 62, 66 (1921); Hale v. Hale, 146
111. 227, 33 N. E. 858, 867 (1893); RESTATEM ENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 85-88 (1942); 1
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS § 435 (5th ed. 1925).-
10. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 83 (1942); see Note, 57 HARv. L, REV. 98, 100
(1943).
11. Cressler .v. Brown, 79 Okla. 170, 192 Pac. 417 (1920) (surety may take
advantage of judgment for principal); Lasher v. McAdam, 125 Misc. 685, 211 N. Y.
Supp. 395 (Sup. Ct. 1925) (failure to get judgment against master bar to subsequent
suit against servant); see generally, RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§ 94-111 (1942) ; I
FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS §§ 409, 444-68 (5th ed. 1925); Notes, 57 HARv. L. REv. 98
(1943), 35 YALE L. J. 607, 609 (1926), 91 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467, 469 (1943).
12. Accord, Unaka & City National Bank of Johnson City v. Lewis, 203 N. C.
644, 166 S. E. 800 (1932); Peck v. Merchants Transfer and Storage Co. of Topeka,
85 Kan. 126, 116 Pac. 365 (1911); cf.*Hornstein v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc.,
133 F. 2d 143 (C. C. A. 3d 1943) (on analogous facts, held that finding of negligence
against third party in suit by bailor for damages to truck was not conclusive on third
party in a suit by him against the bailee for personal injuries); see RESTATEMENT,
JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (1942). But cf. C. I. T. Corp. v. Hungerford, 11 N. J. Misc. 897,
168 Atl. 791 (Dist. Ct. 1933) (denial of recovery to bailee barred later suit by bailor) ;
Ladany v. Assad, 91 Conn. 316, 99 Atl. 762 (1917) (where suit against bailee involved
title to bailed property).
13. 61 A. 2d at 182.
14. Cf. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F. 2d 82
(C. C. A. 3d 1941), 9 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 977. See note 8 supra.
15. Terry v. Pennsylvania R. R., 35 Del. 1, 156 Atl. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1931) ; Union
Pacific R. R. v. Meyer, 76 Neb. 549, 107 N. W. 793 (1906); Railway Express Agency
Inc., v. Goodman's New York & Connecticut Express Corp., 129 Conn. 386, 28 A.
2d 869 (1942).
16. Corcoran v. Huntington Lumber & Coal Co., 211 App. Div. 803, 206 N. Y.
Supp. 752 (2d Dep't 1924); Harris v. Seaboard Airline Ry., 190 N. C. 480, 130 S. E.
319 (1925) ; Terry v. Pennsylvania R. R., 35 Del. 1, 156 Atl. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
RECENT CASES
bar the bailor.17 The definition of privity announced in the instant case would
not explain these results, but the Restatement definition would.
It seems that the problem of who is or is not bound by a judgment may
have been obscured by the use of the terms "privity" and "privies." Is At
least to state categorically that there is or is not privity in a certain relation-
ship, such as bailor and bailee, is not conclusive. The policy behind the
doctrine of res judicata often requires that persons other than parties to
the action be affected by a judgment in situations where no privity, in any
technical sense, can be found. It is perhaps preferable to recognize that
these cases are exceptions to the general rule that a judgment is binding
only on the parties and their privies, rather than to attempt to reconcile
them with the rule by "stretching the concept of privity beyond its traditional
legal meaning.
MARRIAGE-ANNULMENT FOR INCAPACITY-EFFECT OF ISSUE FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION BY HUSBAND
H and W were married in 1942. Both were physically capable, but the
marriage was never consummated because of a psychological condition in H.
Beginning in 1946, artificial insemination was attempted, utilizing semen of
H, but not until after W left H in 1948 was it discovered that the treatment
had resulted in pregnancy. Following the birth of a son in September, 1948,
W4V petitioned for a decree of nullity on grounds of incapacity of H. Held,
decree granted despite the fact that it would bastardize the child. L. v. L.,
[1949] 1 All Eng. 141 (Prob., Div. & Adm.).
Under English law, incapacity of orxe of the parties to consummate the
marriage, at the time of the marriage, makes that marriage voidable only and
not void.' This rule, canonical in origin, is recognized in the United States by
statutes in most states,2 but-there is a difference of opinion as to whether or
17. C. I. T. Corp. v. Hungerford, 11 N. J. Misc. 897, 168 Atl. 791 (Dist. Ct. 1933);
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 88(1) (b) (1942).
18. Taylor v. Sartorious, 130 Mo. App. 23, 108 S. W. 1089, 1094 (1908): "The
question of who is concluded by a judgment has been obscured by the use of the words
"privity' and 'privies,' which in their precise technical meaning in law are scarcely
determinative always of who is and who is not bound by a judgment. Courts have
striven sometimes to give effect to the general doctrine that a judgment is only binding
between parties and their privies by extending the signification of the word 'privies' to
include relationships not originally embraced in it, whereas the true reason for holding
the issue res judicata does not necessarily depend on privity, but on the policy of the
law to end litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial of a question of
fact from again drawing it into controversy."
1. 10 1-IALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 640, 641 (Hailsham ed. 1933) and cases cited.
As to confusion in the use of the terms "void" and "voidable," see Newark, OPeration
of Nudlity Decrees, 8 MOD. L. RE,. 203 (1945), and letter in reply by Latey in 11 MOD.
L. REv. 70 (1948). For discussion as to what constitutes capacity in the marital rela-
tionship, see Kingsley, Physical Capacity to Marry, 20 So. CALIF. L. RFV. 319 (1947).
2. 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAIILY LAWS § 50 (1931).
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not equity could act in the absence of statute.3 It has been held that a physical
defect is not essential to incapacity-a psychological block resulting in physical
incapacity is sufficient.4
In determining whether or not a decree should issue in annulment pro-
ceedings, the courts enjoy discretion and take into consideration the motives
of the party seeking the decree, possible equitable estoppel, and public policy.
Requests for decrees of annulment for incapacity have been refused where the
party complained of was obviously too old to be capable at the time of the
marriage,5 where an unreasonable time was allowed to elapse before proceed-
ings were instituted,6 and where the party complained of had changed his
position in reliance on the marriage.
7
Natural issue resulting from an unconsummated marriage is of course
most unusual, and prior to the principal case the only instance of such issue
occurred as the result of fecundatio ab extra during attempts to consummate.8
Thus the court had little authority on which to rely in determining whether or
not the presence of issue alone would influence the granting or withholding
of the decree. In this case of first impression, the court followed what little
authority existed and in so doing treated the two situations .as analogous. Al-
though the result of both situations is the birth of issue, there is a possible
difference. In this case, artificial insemination 9 ' was resorted to voluntarily by
both parties with the intention of producing a child; in the case of fecundatio
ab extra, the production of issue is accidental. It would seem that the presence
of intention might possibly be made the basis of estoppel.
If nothing more than a decree of annulment is granted, the effect of dis-
solution of the voidable union is to place the parties in the same position as
existed before the marriage. 1° Thus, in reality the avoiding of the marriage
3. Anonymous, 24 N. J. Eq. 19 (1873); Burtis v. Burtis, 1 Hopk. Ch. 557, 14 Am.
Dec. 563 (N. Y. 1825). But see Smith v. Morehead, 59 N. C. 360 (1863). See also
Spencer, Some Phases of Marriage Law and Legislation from a Sanitary and Engenic
Standpoint, 25 YALE L. J. 58, 92 (1915) ; Note, L. R. A. 1916 C, 694.
4. R. G. v. J. G., 93 L. J. P. C. 163 (1924); Tompkins v. Tompkins, 92 N. J. Eq.
113, 111 At. 599 (1920), 6 CORN. L. Q. 333 (1921), 69 U. OF PA. L. REV. 388 (1921).
5. Hatch v. Hatch, 58 Misc. 54, 110 N. Y. Supp. 18 (Sup. Ct. 1908).
6. Kirschbaum v. Kirschbaum, 92 N. J. Eq. 7, 111 Atl. 697 (1920). As to statutes
of limitations specifying the time within which suit must be brought to annul for
impotency, see 1 VERNIER, AmERIcAN FAMILY LAWS § 56 (1931).
7. Watters v. Watters, 168 N. C. 411, 84 S. E. 703 (1915).
8. Clarke v. Clarke, [1943] 2 All Eng. 540 (P. 1942), distinguished in the instant
case, (1949] 1 All Eng. at 144.
9. For recent discussions of the legal problems presented by artificial insemination,
see generally Koerner, Medicolegal Considerations in Artifical Insemination, 8 LA. L.
REv. 484 (1948) ; Tucker, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 33 WoMtFN L, J.
57 (1947) ; Notes, 33 MINN. L. RE . 145 (1949), 34 VA. L. REV. 822 (1948, 58 YALE L. J.
457 (1949).
10. Newbould v. Attorney-General, [1931] P. 75; P. v. P., [1916] 2 Ir. R. 400;
People ex rel. Byrnes v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 (1933) ; Riesen v. Riesen,
105 N. J. Eq. 144, 147 Atl. 225 (1929) ; Sleicher v. Sleicher, 251 N. Y. 366, 167 N. E.
501 (1929) ; see also 1 BisHop, MARRIAGE AND DIVoRcE § 105 (6th ed. 1881) ; TIFFANY,




results in making it void ab initio and renders any issue illegitimate."1 The
court in the principal case was faced with the dilerima of (1) refusing the
decree and thus enforcing an unhappy and abnormal marriage, or (2) grant-
ing the decree and leaving the child of the dissolved marriage stained with the
stigma of illegitimacy. It chose the latter course as the lesser of two evils.
.The ideal solution to the problem presented would be to grant the decree
but to make the issue legitimate. Statutes in many American juiisdictions
achieve this result and thereby eliminate the dilemma present in the instant
case. 12 These statutes are not universal in the United States, however, and
many are so ambiguous as to present the courts with difficult problems of
construction.' 3 In at least one state it has been held as a matter of common
law that the issue of an annulled marriage is legitimate. 14 With legitimacy a
matter of public concern and with artificial insemination likely to come into
more popular use, the need is great for legislation to cope with the problem
presented in the principal case.
NEGLIGENCE-EMPLOYEE IN PERIL DUE TO OWN FAULT-LIABILITY
OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER TO ONE INJURED TRYING
TO RESCUE EMPLOYEE
The driver of defendant's truck negligently collided with another vehicle.
Unconscious from the impact, he was in a position of great peril when fire
threatened the cargo of butane gas carried in the truck. Plaintiff, a pedestrian,
in attempting to rescue the driver, suffered severe burns from 'exploding
gas. Action for damages against the driver and his employer. Held, plaintiff may
recover from both. The negligence of the person rescued makes him liable
to the rescuer, and this negligence is imputed to the employer under the
doctrine of respondeat superior. Longacre v. Reddick, 215 S. W. 2d 404
(Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
The "rescue doctrine," long recognized by the courts, has usually
been applied in situations where the defendant negligently imperils a third
person and the plaintiff is injured in attempting to avert the danger. Almost
universally the rescuer has been allowed recovery in these situations. He is
held to be within the risk created by the defendant's negligence; his coming
11. E.g., Matter of Moncrief's Will, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923), 8 CORN. L.
Q. 364; JACOBS, CASES Ox DOuIESTIC RELATIONS 323 (2d ed. 1939) ; 1 SCHOULER, MAR-
RIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 14 (6th ed. 1921).
12. 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 48 (1931), 4 id. § 247 (1931).
13. Ibid. In at least one jurisdiction a statute provides specifically that when a mar-
riage is annulled because of the impotency of the husband, any issue of the wife shall be
illegitimate. IOWA CODE § 598.22 (1946). It must have been passed under the assumption
that the husband could not possibly be the father of the child if he was impotent, and
its application to facts like those in the instant case poses an interesting problem.
14. Erwin v. Bass, 172 Miss. 332, 160 So. 568 (1935) ; Bass v. Erwin; 177 Miss. 46,
170 So. 673 (1936), 10 Miss. L. J. 85 (1937).
1949 1]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
is deemed to be foreseeable and a natural and probable consequence of that
negligence; and, unless 'clearly rash and reckless, his risking life and limb
is not regarded as contributory negligence as a matter of law or as assump-
tion of risk.1 "Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons
to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing
conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their
effects within the range of the natural and probable." 2
In the few cases involving the right of an injured rescuer to recover
from a person negligently self-imperilled or from that person's employer,
however, there is a split of authority. The early case of Saylor v. Parsons 3
held that there could be no recovery- from either the rescued or his master
since there were lacking both a duty to the rescuer and proximate causation."
Having no duty to keep himself free from danger, a rescued person solely
responsible for his own peril could not be negligent toward a rescuer. Except
in cases involving separate negligence by the defendant toward a rescuer
who had already begun hiA attempt to save a third person, the court in the
Saylor case regarded the rights of a rescuer as derived from those of the
rescued. 5 Not all courts have agreed that the rescuer's rights are derivative
in other types of cases,6 but until fairly recently there was little dissent from
1. Upon the rescue doctrine generally, see BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW o" TORTS
568 (4th ed. 1926) ; 3 COOLEY, TORTS § 487 (4th ed. 1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS 358 (1941) ;
2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 445, 472 (1934) ; Carpenter, Workable Rules for Deterunhifiu
Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 533 (1932) ; Note, 11 Mo. L. REV. 317 (1946,
For collections of cases upon various phases of the rescue problem, see Notes, 5 A. L.
R. 206 (1920), 19 A. L. R. 4 (1922), 158 A. L. R. 189 (1945), 166 A. L. R. 752 (1947).
2. Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437, 438 (1921). Where
property, rather than persons, is rescued, the person negligently endangering the
property is generally held liable to the owner or person in charge who is injured in
attempting to avert the danger, provided that the acts of the latter are not unreasonable
under the circumstances; in general however, less risk may be incurred in the rescue
of property than in that of persons before the conduct is classed as unreasonable,
Condiff v. Kansas City, Ft. S. & G. R. R., 46 Kan. 256, 25 Pac. 562, 564 (1891); see
Notes, 64 A. L. R. 515 (1929), 166 A. L. R. 752 (1947). Where one attempts to save
property in which he owns no interest, the courts are more ready to find contributory
negligence than'in cases involving the rescue of persons. See, e.g., Pike v. Grand Trunk
Ry., 39 Fed. 255 (C. C. D. N. H. 1889). However, liability has been found in some such
cases. E.g., Superior Oil Co. v. Richmond, 172 Miss. 407, 159 So. 850 (1935).
3. 122 Iowa 679, 98 N. W. 500 (1904) (rescued negligently placed self in danger of
collapse of undermined wall).
4. 98 N. W. at 502.
5. Id. at 501.
6. "The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperilled victim; it is a
wrong also to his rescuer." Wagner v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437
(1921). This theory will explain holdings in some situations that a separate duty is owed
to the rescuer. It has been held that even when the rescued is contributorily negligent
in creating his peril and may not recover from the defendant, his negligence is not
imputed to the rescuer so as to bar the latter. Pierce v. United Gas & Electric Co., 161
Cal. 176, 118 Pac. 700 (1911); Lynch v. Fisher, 34 So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1948):
Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lynch, 69 Ohio St. 123, 68 N. E. 703 (1903) ; Bond
v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 82 W. Va. 557, 96 S. E. 932 (1918); see Note, 5 A. L. R.
206 (1920). Contra: Scates v. Rapid Transit Ry., 171 S. W. 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
But it has been held that a landowner is not liable to one entering upon his land to
rescue a trespasser to whom the landowner had no duty of care. Ryan v. Towar, 128
Mich. 463, 87 N. Mr. 644 (1901). For an argument that a rescuer should be treated
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the rule of the Saylor case in the rare situation where only the rescued person
was at fault in creating the danger.7 In 1932, the opposite result was reached
in a New Jersey case s which permitted the rescuer to recover, but upon a
different theory.9 In 1944, the Supreme Court of Michigan allowed recovery
to the rescuer of a driver who had negligently placed himself in peril.'9
While drawing a dubious distinction from the Saylor case," the court held
that the person rescued owed a duty to one saving him from the dangerous
situation which he had created; the possibility of rescue was deemed a fore-
seeable result of his negligent conduct. Two years later a New York court
openly refused to follow the Saylor rule in a widely approved opinion.12
Adopting a theory long before advanced by Professor Bohlen in his criticism
of the Saylor case, 13 the court held that a separate duty is owed to a rescuer
not to create in his vicinity a situation inviting rescue, and that injuries to
him resulting from breach of that duty are foreseeable.
The principal case is clearly in line with the majority of the modern
decisions in holding the negligent driver liable. There seems to be no valid
reason for deiying recovery in this type of case. If, as has frequently been
said, the rescue doctrine is a humanitarian one, 14 and if the law looks with
favor upon the rescuer, 15 there is no reason to show less favor to him when
as a person rightfully upon the land to whom a separate duty is owed, see 73 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 409 (1925).
7. "[A] person who places himself in peril is not guilty of negligence toward
another Which entitles the latter to recover for injury suffered in attempting to rescue
him from his peril." 20 R. C. L. 133 (1918). Cf. Alabama Power Co. v. Conine, 213
Ala. 228, 104 So. 535 (1925) (rescued negligently seized fallen power line; employer
not liable to estate of rescuer); Linz Realty Co. v. McDonald, 133 S. W. 535 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1911) (driller on oil well negligently imperilled self; employer not liable to
rescuer); Dupuis v. New Regina Trading Co., Ltd., [1943] 2 W. W. R. 593, [1943]
4 D. L. R. 275 (Sask. C. A.) (rescuer killed in attempt to save defendant's negligently
self-imperilled elevator operator), criticized 21 CAN. B. REV. 758 (1943).
8. Butler v. Jersey Coast News Co., 109 N. J. L. 255, 160 Atl. 659 (1932) (employer
held liable to rescuer of servant imperilled because of reckless driving), noted 31
MICH. L. REV. 584 (1933), criticized 13 B. U. L. REV. 371 (1933).
9. A duty toward the plaintiff was found upon the basis of his rights as user of
the highway. Because the danger from broken and fallen power lines surrounding
the truck from which the rescue was made was not deemed ".obvious," the court held
that the rescue doctrine did not apply. 160 Atl. 659, 661 (1932). As to the soundness
of this theory, see 32 CORN. L. Q. 605, 608 n. 16 (1947).
10. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N. W. 2d 668 (1944), 43 MICH. L. REV.
980 (1945), 10 Mo. L. REv. 321 (1945).
11. In the Saylor case "plaintiff was proceeding at his own risk on private prop-
erty. . . . In the instant case defendant Bigelow was bound by the laws of Michigan
to exercise due care for the safety of others in his driving upon a public highway."
16 N. W. 2d at 671.
12. Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N. Y. S. 2d 902 (4th Dep't 1946),
aff'd mene., 296 N. Y. 1056, 73 N. E. 2d 120 (1947) (defendant ndangered from own
carelessly-parked automobile and rescued by plaintiff, a guest of tenants on defendant's
farm). Among the many favorable comments upon the case in the law reviews are: 32
CORN. L. Q. 605 (1947) ; 45 MICH. L. REV. 918 (1947) ; 18 Miss. L. J. 483 (1947) ; 20
ROCKY MT. L. Rav. 414 (1948); and 14 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 509 (1947).
13. Bohlen, Liability in. Tort of Infants and Insane Persons, 23 MICH. L. Rrv. 9,
30 n. 33 (1924), reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 568 n. 33 (4th ed.
1926).
14. See. e.g.. 3 COOLEY, TORTS § 487 (4th ed. 1932), and cases cited.
15. McLaughlin, Pro.ximate Cause, 39 HARv. L. REV. 149, 171 (1925); cf. Wagner
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the rescued is the negligent person than when a third person carelessly
creates the danger. Certainly the rescuer is as heroic in one instance as in
the other. And if duty and causation can be found in the usual rescue case,
either upon the "foreseeability" test or upon any other, 16 they can be discov-
ered when the rescued himself is negligently responsible for the danger. The
negligence lies in carelessly creating a situation of peril in or near the
presence of the rescuer.17
In imposing liability upon the employer, the instant case goes one step
further than the Michigan and New York cases, where no master-servant
relationship was involved; but the step is a natural one.'8 Admittedly the
employer in the principal case was free from negligence toward either his
driver or the plaintiff; but, as pointed out by the court, liability is imposed
upon him, not because of his own conduct, but because he is the master of
a servant whose negligence has resulted in injury to the plaintiff.'9 There
seems to be no reason for distinguishing the present case from any other
where vicarious liability is imposed, under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
upon a master who is himself free from fault.
20
v. International Ry., 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921); Eckert v. Long Island R. R.,
43 N. Y. 502, 506, 3 Am. Rep. 721 (1871); Corbin v. City of Philadelphia, 195 Pa.
461, 45 Atl. 1070, 1072 (1900).
16. Although generally approving the rescue doctrine, several authorities have
pointed out that the "foi-eseeability" test is highly unrealistic. See, e.g., PROSSE, TORTS
359 (1941) and Bohlen, Book Review, 47 HARV. L. REv. 556, 557 (1934).
17. Probably where defendant had negligently endangered his own property the
courts would be slower to impose liability upon him for injuries sustained by plaintiff
in rescuing it, but in principle there is no reason why such liability might not be found.
See cases supra, note 2.
18. The employer was held liable to the rescuer of his servant in Butler v. Jersey
Coast News Co., 109 N. J. L. 255, 160 Atl. 659 (1932), but as indicated previously
the servant's negligence was not founded upon the rescue theory. Supra, note 9. Con-
trast the language of the court in the principal case, 215 S. W. 2d at 406.
19. As to the employer's contention that a rescuer may never recover when the
rescued himself has no right to recover, the court merely said that in this type of
case the rule has no application. It could have pointed out that in some other types of
cases the contention would not hold. One of these is when the defendant is negligent
toward the rescuer but not toward the rescued. See, e.g., Donahoe v. Wabash, St. L.
& P. R. R., 83 Mo. 560, 53 Am. Rep. 594 (1884) (trainmen negligent in not seeing
mother rescuing child fr6m tracks, but not negligent toward the child) ; 2 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 472, comment b (1934); Note, 19 A. L. R. 4, 11 (1922). Another is when
the rescued has been contributorily negligent in creating the peril. 2 RESTATEMENT,
TORTS § 472, comment b (1934) ; see cases cited supra, note 6. There are also situations
in which a master is held liable to one injured by his servant's negligence when the
person injured would not be able to hold the servant himself. See, e.g., Hudson v. Gas
Consumers Ass'n, 123 N. J. L. 252, 8 A. 2d 337 (1939) (defendant held liable to
wife negligently injured by her husband, employee of defendant, even though she could
not sue her husband); Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co., 249 N. Y. 253, 164
N. E. 42 (1928), 42 'HARv. L. REv. 697 (same). But cf. Raines v. Mercer, 165 Tenn.
415, 55 S. W. 2d 263 (1932), 11 TENN. L. REV. 281 (1933) (plaintiff denied recovery
from father of her husband for injuries incurred by the son's reckless driving of father's
car prior to marriage with plaintiff).
20. For discussion of the theoretical and practical bases of respondeat superior, see
Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 105 (1916). Where, as in tile
principal case, the master is held liable to the rescuer of his negligent servant, it is,
of course, necessary that the servant be acting within the scope of his employment
when he places himself in peril. The liability of the employer in this type of case
would seem to be no broader than in any other case where vicarious liability is imposed.
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NEGLIGENCE-PROOF OF CAUSE IN FACT-LIABILITY OF TWO
NEGLIGENT DEFENDANTS WHEN IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL WHOSE
SHOT INJURED PLAINTIFF
The two defendants and the plaintiff were hunting together when the
plaintiff was injured as the defendants simultaneously fired at a bird, the plain-
tiff being in the line of fire. Both the defendants were found negligent, but it
was impossible to ascertain which one caused the injury. Held, the defendants
were jointly and severally liable. Summers v,. Tice, 199 P. 2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
In tort law joint and several liability is generally limited to cases where
the several defendants have either: (1) acted in concert ; (2) acted separately
but each contributed to produce a single indivisible injury; 2 (3) violated a
common duty;3 or (4) had some special relationship between them such as
master and servant 4 or partnership.5 None of these grounds is applicable to
the present case. There is no concert of action here, because concert requires
an actual intent or at least conscious realization among the defendants that
they are joining in the commission of a wrongful act.6 Neither does the second
possibility apply, since here all the harm was caused by one or the other of the
defendants, not by both. It is clear that there is no special relationship, nor is
there a common duty, since that concept pertains to cases where the same duty
is owed by two or more persons, such as the duty to maintain a party wall.
7
Because the instant case did not fit into any of these rules the defendants
contended they should be treated as independent tortfeasors, each liable for
the damage caused by him alone.8 However, the court pointed out that a wrong
had been done by one of the defendants and that a holding for the plaintiff was
desirable. Because the court felt the desired result was not possible under
the existing rules of law, it chose a basis of decision for which there is no
case authority. It held that the burden of proof of causation was shifted to
the defendants, and joint and several liability was imposed for failure to bear
the burden. To justify the decision the court drew an analogy to the res ipsa
1. E.g., Meints v. Huntington, 276 Fed. 245, 19 A. L. R. 664 (C. C. A. 8th 1921);
Reyher v. Mayne, 90 Colo. 586, 10 P. 2d 1109 (1932).
2. E.g., Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va. 521, 88 S. E. 174, 4 A. L. R. 1480 (1916) ; PROSSER,
TORTS § 47 (1941).
3. E.g., Woods v. Kansas City, K. V. & W. R. R., 134 Kan. 755, 8 P. 2d 404, 407
(1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 47 (1941) ; 4 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 878 (1949).
4. E.g., Weaver v. Hale, 82 Fla. 88, 89 So. 363 (1921) ; 1 COOLEY, TORTS § 87 (4th cd.
1932) ; PROSSER, TORTS § 47 (1941).
5. E.g., Caplan v. Caplan, 268 N. Y. 445, 198 N. E. 23, 101 A. L. R. 1223 (1935) ; 1
COOLEY, TORTS § 88 (4th ed. 1932).
6. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 429 (1937). In
the principal case the court considered the concert-of-action concept at length, and although
it did not entirely repudiate the idea, it did say that it would be straining the concept to
hold for the plaintiff on that ground. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF.
L. REv. 413, 430 (1937). But see Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666, 50 A. L. R
357 (1926) ; 4 RESTATEINENT, TORTS § 876(b) (1939).
7. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 431 (1937)
8. 1 COOLEY, TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1932).
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loquitur doctrine, but it did not attempt to fit this case into that doctrine. In-
stead, it reasoned that policy and justice demanded that the plaintiff be relieved
of the burden. The defendants were the wrongdoers and they could best offer
evidence as to who caused the harm.
Several writers have suggested this general result, with the possible quali-
fication that it might not apply if the deferidants were too numerous.9 In this
case the total injury was caused by one of the negligent defendants, but it was
impossible to tell which. The language of the decision does not clearly indicate
whether the new technique will be confined only to this fact situation. First, it
may be extended to cases* where several defendants, who were clearly negli-
gent, are each known to have caused only a part of the harm but the propor-
tion each caused is difficult or impossible to prove. 10 Or, second, it might pos-
sibly be extended to any case in which the defendant (or defendants) is clearly
negligent and proof of causation is difficult or impossible. It seems likely that
the influence of the decision will be limited to fact situations similar to the in-
stant case and the first group, but there is some possibility that the case is
starting on an entirely new doctrine which would apply to all three.1
WILLS-HOLOGRAPHIC CODICIL-INTERLINEATIONS ON FACE
OF WILL
Testator's properly executed and attested typewritten will contained
two interlineations and an additional paragraph at the bottom.' The inter-
9. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CALIF. L. REV.
396, 406 (1932) ; Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEx. L. REX'. 399,
415 (1939) ; cf. WIGMORE, A Summnary of the Principles of Torts § 153, in 2 SELECT
CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 833, 865 (1912).
10. For example, it could be applied to stream pollution cases where recovery may be
denied the plaintiff if he does not prove the proportion of the damage each of the defendants
caused. Tucker Oil Co. v. Matthews, 119 S. W. 2d 606 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938). Some courts
hold the defendants jointly and severally liable in the stream pollution cases because
there was a single indivisible injury. Johnson v. Thomas Irvine Lumber Co., 75 Wash. 53Q,
135 Pac. 217 (1913), rev'd on other grounds, 140 Pac. 577 (1914) ; Wigmore, Note, 17
ILL. L. REV. 458 (1923).
11. As an indication of the uncertainty of the scope of the doctrine in the instant case,
consider the following selections from the opinion: "When we consider the relative position
of the parties and the results that would flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on
one of the defendants only, a requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be
shifted to defendants becomes manifest. They are both wrongdoers-both negligent toward
plaintiff. They brought about a situation where the negligence of one of them injured the
plaintiff, hence it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can .... Ordinarily
defendants are in a far better position to offer evidence to determine which one caused the
injury... If defendants are independent tort feasors and thus each liable for the damage
caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter of apportionment is incapable of proof,
the innocent wronged party should not be deprived of his right to redress. The wrongdoers
should be left to work out between themselves any apportionment." 199 P. 2d at 4, 5.
1. The pertinent portions of the will with additions in testator's handwriting are
as follows (with that part in testator's handwriting shown in italics) : "4. I give and
bequeath to Mrs. Elizabeth P. McKay, to Mrs. Hattie Propst and to my Nephew,
Will Mayhew, the sum of Fifty Dollars each, and to my faithful servant. Mary Jane
Martin, the sum of Fifty Dollars. and to my nephew Burns Elkins 50.00 dollars 5. All
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lineations and additional paragraph, altering two bequests and creating
another, were wholly in testator's handwriting and were signed by testator
beneath the added paragraph. These changes, made after the execution of
the will, were only partially inconsistent with the will, and no intention to
revoke the will was found. Held (6-1), that the added portions in testator's
handwriting constituted a valid holographic codicil to the will. In re Goodnuat's
Will, 229 N. C. 444, 50 S. E. 2d 34 (1948).
A codicil is considered as an addition to the will, to be construed with
it as one instrument.2 It will be deemed to revoke the will only to the extent
that its terms are inconsistent with it or an intention to revoke is clearly
mani fested.
3
Holographic wills and codicils must be wholly written and signed in
the handwriting of the testator. 4 But many cases have held that a holographic
document is not invalidated by the presence of printed or written matter not
in testator's handwriting if the words in testator's handwriting alone are
sufficient to express testamentary intent.5 A codicil to a formal will may be
holographic. 6 A codicil may be executed on the same sheet as the will.7
Even in states recognizing holographic wills, unsigned interlineations
or marginal notes in testator's handwriting, inscribed after execution of the
will, are mere surplusage.8 Although they will not effect an alteration or
revocation by subsequent writing, the may be found to effect a revocation
the remainder of my property, if any, I give and bequeath to Mrs. W. S. Wellborn,
Mrs. Ida W. Stamey, Mrs. Tom Hough and Mason Goodman, share and share alike.
Mrs. Stainey gets 1 one half of my estate if size keeps me to the end." Then at the
bottom, following the testator's and witnesses' signatures: "My dinon ring to be sold
if needed to carrie out my will if not given to my grand daughter Mary Iris Goodman.
Mary E. Goodman." [Record, Exhibit "A".]
2. E.g., Third Nat. Bank v. Scribner, 175 Tenn. 14, 130 S. W. 2d 126 (1939).
3. E.g., Ewell v. Sneed, 136 Tenn. 602, 191 S. W. 131 (1917) ; Jackman v. Kasper,
393 Ill. 496, 66 N. E. 2d 678 (1946) ; Klein v. Gaines, 34 So. 2d 488 (Miss. 1948).
4. See generally ATKINSON, WILLS § 134 (1937). Wills written in testator's hand-
writing and signed by him, without attestation, are recognized in about 20 states.
5. Jones v. Myers, 178 Tenn. 24, 154 S. W. 2d 245 (1941); In re Morrison's
Estate, 55 Ariz. 504, 103 P. 2d 669 (1940) ; In re Durlewanger's Estate, 41 Cal. App. 2d
750, 107 P. 2d 477 (1940) ; i re Wallace's Will, 227 N. C. 459, 42 S. E. 2d 520 (1947);
Moyers v. Gregory, 175 Va. 230, 7 S. E. 2d 881 (1940). ,
6. In re Soher's Estate, 78 Cal. 477, 21 Pac. 8 (1889) ; In re Hengen's Estate, 337
Pa. 547, 12 A. 2d 119 (1940) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 183 Va. 663, 33 S. E. 2d 181
(1945).
7. In re Johnston's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 197, 221 Pac. 382 (1923) (holographic
codicil commencing after signatures of witnesses and concluded on separate sheet);
Witter v. Mott, 2 Conn. 67 (1816) (revocation clause written and signed by testator
on back of will) ; Duncan v. Duncan, 23 Ill. 364 (1860) ; In re Johnson's Estate, 169
Misc. 215, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 81 (Sup. Ct. 1938); Clark v. Carpenter, 14 Ohio App. 278
(1921).
8. Board of Nat. Missions of the Presbyterian Church v. Sherry, 372 Ill. 272, 23
N. E. 2d 730 (1939); In re Rinker's Estate, 158 Kan. 406, 147 P. 2d 740 (1944)
(testator wrote "null and void-later will" in margin) ; Stuart v. Foutz, 185 Md. 401,
45 A. 2d 98 (1945); Yont v. Eads, 317 Mass. 232, 57 N. E. 2d 531 (1944); In re
Tremain's Will, 282 N. Y. 485, 27 N. E. 2d 19 (1940); In re Williams' Estate, 336 Pa.
235, 9 A. 2d 377 (1939). But cf., It re Smith's Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 563, 191 P. 2d 413
(1948) (revocation written and signed by testator across face of unexecuted copy of
will held a valid revocation, not by cancellation, but by subsequent writing.)
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by cancellation if they deface the words of the will.9 But if the interlineations
or notes are signed by testator and show testamentary intent, the requirements
of a holographic codicil would seem to be fulfilled. 10
The ruling in the instant case that the added paragraph 11 constituted
a valid holographic codicil is correct.12 Upon the same reasoning, the inter-
lineation to paragraph (5) 13 at least, should be included as part of such
codicil. 14 The possible objection that the interlineation following paragraph
(4) 15 does not in itself express testamentary intent may be disposed of by
observing that the requisite testamentary intent is shown by the other
portions of the holographic writing, of which this interlineation is a part.
9. E.g., In re Barrie's Will, 393 Ill. 111, 65 N. E. 2d 433 (1946).
10. In re Atkinson's Estate, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 Pac. 425 (1930). In the follow-
ing cases the interlineations were unsigned, but the language in the opinions indicates
that had the testator signed them they would have 'been held valid as holographic
codicils. Board of Nat. Missions of the Presbyterian Church v. Sherry, 372 Ill. 272,
23 N. E. 2d 730, 732 (1939) ; Yont v. Eads, 317 Mass. 232, 57 N. E. 2d 531, 532 (1944) ;
In re Tremain's Will, 282 N. Y. 485, 27 N. E. 2d 19, 22 (1940) ; In re Williams'
Estate, 336 Pa. 235, 9 A. 2d. 377, 378 (1939). See ATicInSON, WILLS § 160 (1937).
11. See note 1 supra.
12. Cf. I; re Johnston's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 197, 221 Pac. 382 (1923) (fact that
holographic codicil appeared partly on same sheet as will following signatures of wit-
nesses not even suggested as a ground for challenging its validity).
13. See note 1 supra.
14. In re Atkinson's Estate, 110 Cal. App. 499, 294 Pac. 425 (1930).
15. See note I supra.
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